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In this study two-step cluster analysis was used in an exploratory effort to try and determine what 
the primary typologies of terrorism are in the United States based on the profiles of individual 
terrorist who operated in the United States from 1948 – 2016. From this, it was discovered that 
terrorists in the United States can be classified into two overarching typologies. The first one can 
most appropriately be called political extremism and the second typology may be titled religious 
extremism. These findings suggest that terrorists have varying characteristics in accordance with 
which typology they are classified by. Moreover, this study also found that terrorists share some 
common characteristics that make them unique among other types of social deviants. 
 
Introduction 
There is no doubt that terrorism has become one of the most well-publicized issues of our time. 
However, despite its continual occupation in the headlines of news-outlets all across the western 
world, most notably since the events of September 11
th
, 2001, terrorism is in no way a new 
addition to the human experience. Indeed, its existence can be traced all the way back to the 
advent of the written word – and most likely, much longer than that. In its long and fairly well-
documented history, the sheer vastness in the manner in which it has manifested itself into the 
public sphere has changed substantially. Terrorism is a phenomenon constructed from mixed and 
often conflicting political and ideological perspectives. This makes attempts to try and 
holistically interpret and classify its true nature a highly elusive undertaking. Starting with 
Hebrew Zealots, who opposed the Roman Empire’s occupation of Palestine, terrorism sweeps 
across the historical time-line to the Jacobin’s Reign of Terror in revolutionary France, the 
anarchists struggle against Czarist Russia, the Algerian revolutionaries rise against French 
colonialism, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) opposition to British rule, and most recently, the 
international threat of Islamic extremism displayed most prominently by groups like Al-Qaeda 
(AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). In viewing terrorism across history, the phenomenon may best 
be described as a means by which a small group of extremists, with political persuasions from 
both the right and left and with ideologies ranging from Marxism to religious extremism, can 
carry out insurrections against their enemies (Laqueur & Wall, 2018).  
In considering the multiple social, psychological, and political factors that drives people 
to become terrorists, the main purpose of the current study is to advance the research literature 
by better defining the different typologies of terrorism that exist based on the characteristics of 
the individuals who engage in terrorism. To this end, the current study uses the data mining 
technique of two-step cluster analysis to explore what the primary typologies of terrorism are in 
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the United States based on the profiles of individual terrorist who operated in the United States 
from 1948 – 2016. 
 
The Current Study 
 
To date, many research efforts attempting to categorize terrorism into typologies have been made 
primarily through the use of two methods. The first is to use case studies that focus on a small 
sample of terrorists to try classify them based on a thick, rich description of the phenomenon. 
However, this approach has a limited capacity for replication or for transferring conclusions into 
more generalized explanations (Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007). The second is to aggregate 
terrorists into large samples and to categorize them based on overarching themes. The drawback 
to this approach is that it can be overly broad and often fails to capture contextual qualities and 
peculiarities among cases (Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007). 
 In this current research project I hope to strike a balance between these two methods by 
following up on a recommendation made in Chenoweth and Lowham (2007) to use the unique 
capacity of cluster analysis in order to take an expansive view of terrorism over multiple time 
periods while preserving the comprehensive qualities that can get easily lost in other types of 
large-scale evaluations. Moreover, the current study differs from most other attempts at 
categorizing terrorism because I redirected the level of analysis away from the group-level and 
towards the individual terrorists themselves. To this end, I used the profiles of individual 
extremists, who operated in the United States during the years 1948 – 2016, in order to classify 
them across three different dimensions: demographics, personal history, and recruitment-
radicalization processes. By classifying cases in this manner, it is my intention to delve deeper 
into the multiplicity of factors that surround terrorism so that clear distinctions can be made into 
its typologies at the most intimate level. It is my hope that in grouping forms of terrorism based 
on individual terrorists’ characteristics, policymakers will gain a more comprehensive picture of 
how terrorists are both alike and different from one another, and that these insights will help to 
guide them towards constructing counterterrorism policies that are able to adapt to the multiple 
versions of terrorism that have and continue to exist in the United States.  
 
Criteria Used to Define an Individual as a Terrorist 
 
Before moving on to a review of the literature that helped to shape the direction of this research 
project, it is important to note what criteria was used in this study to define a person as a 
terrorist. Since all the data used in this study was acquired through the Profiles of Individual 
Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) dataset, I adopted the same criteria established by 
the dataset developers. Therefore, in this study, individuals were considered terrorists if they had 
espoused Islamist, far right, far left, or single issue ideologies, radicalized within the United 
States to the point of committing ideologically motivated illegal violent or non-violent acts, 
joining a designated terrorist organization, or associating with an extremist organization whose 
leader(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent offense (National 










Terrorist Attacks in the United States 
 
Although media outlets often try to portray the United States as being the primary focus of 
transnational terrorism, researchers examining the trajectory of the problem have determined that 
it is much less of a threat than what is often portrayed by the media (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). 
With regard to the total number of the terrorist attacks directed against the U.S., incidents spiked 
in the 1970s and 1980s and then declined during the 1990s (LaFree, Yang, & Crenshaw, 2009).  
Although terrorist attacks against the United States did show an increase in the early 1990s, these 
trends did not reach the same heights as seen in the 1970s or 1980s. In fact, attacks against U.S. 
targets were actually at a 35-year low just before 9/11 (LaFree et al., 2009). Moreover, among 
the terrorist attacks that have been conducted against U.S. targets, only a fraction of them 
actually took place on U.S. soil – with most of the assaults striking at American targets in other 
countries (LaFree et al., 2009).  
Despite the relatively small number of completed attacks against American targets since 
9/11, U.S. authorities have intercepted a large number of plots by jihadist terrorists before they 
were ever fully carried out. Among these plots, most of them never went beyond the preparation 
phase, and of the ones that did, very few accomplished the full amount of damage that was 
intended. To help put this in perspective, the New American Foundation found that from 2005 – 
2015, 94 U.S. citizens were killed by jihadist terrorists, which is a small portion when compared 
to the number of people killed in such events as mass shooting during this same time period 
(Laqueur & Wall, 2018). Laqueur and Wall (2018) identify two essential reasons why only 94 
people died from jihadist terrorism during this time period. The first reason is the United State’s 
ability to integrate and assimilate its Muslim population into the mainstream culture. The second 
reason is the security reforms that were implemented by the U.S. government in the aftermath of 
9/11.  
With the expansion of such things as the internet and social media, many jihadist terrorist 
attacks that have occurred in the United States have been conducted by individuals who were 
guided, directed, or inspired by foreign elements such as the Islamic State (Asongu, Orim, & 
Nting (2019); Laqueur &Wall, 2018; Zeman, Břeň, & Urban, 2017). This can be seen in such 
attacks as the Garland Texas shooting in May 2015, the San Bernardino shooting in December 
2015, and the Pulse nightclub shooting in June 2016 (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). It is also important 
to keep in mind that many of these shooters were born or grew up in the United States and were 
radicalized while living in the U.S. (Laqueur & Wall, 2018).  
Besides jihadist terrorism, the other substantial terror threat that the United States 
currently faces comes from right-wing extremists (Becker, 2014). Although other forms of 
terrorist ideologies such as left-wing extremism and radical environmentalists do exist in the 
U.S., in terms of actual incidents of violence, these forms of extremism are currently not as 
prevalent as right-wing violence (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). Individuals fitting into the right-wing 
mode of terrorism can be categorized as Christian extremists, white-supremacists, anti-
government groups, and militia groups. Their violence tends to be directed at members of 
minority groups such as Jews, Muslims, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. A 
few examples of these kinds of attacks include: the Oklahoma City bombing, Charleston church 
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shooting, and the 2009 attack against the Holocaust Museum in Washington D.C. The emerging 
threat that right-wing extremism poses to the United States by alt-right and anti-government 
groups is demonstrated by the fact that, in 2017, thirteen terrorist incidents took place in the 
United States. Of these attacks, only two can be attributed to jihadist terrorist; the rest came from 
the extreme right (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). It is also important to keep in mind that terrorist 
attacks committed by right-wing extremists may be underrepresented in the U.S. since such acts 
are not always labeled as terrorist events by the U.S. legal system due to hate-crime laws. Still, 




Concerning the demographic information of individual terrorists, it is almost universally 
accepted by scholars that acts of terrorism are predominantly committed by young males 
(Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015; Sageman, 2008; Russell & Miller, 1977). Traditionally, 
researchers have identified perpetrators of terror as being unmarried (Berrebi, 2007; Chermak & 
Gruenwald, 2015). However, to the contrary, Sageman (2008) determined that the vast majority 
of jihadist terrorists are married and have children. Most researchers have found that terrorists 
are generally well educated, and come from middle to upper-class backgrounds (Berrebi, 2007; 
Chermak & Gruenwald, 2015; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Sageman, 2008). Such 
commonalities among the demographic characteristics of terrorists are understandable when 
considering the nature of terrorism from psychological, sociological and organizational 
perspectives. It is no secret that young males are more prone to experiencing feelings of anger 
towards their society and to act out violently when compared to young females or older 
individuals (Hegghammer, 2006).   
 Moreover, terrorist recruiters tend to focus their attention on drawing young people to 
their cause because, in many cases, the young have not lived long enough to establish a strong 
sense of identity, and are therefore more likely to be attracted to an organization that offers them 
an opportunity to develop a strong sense of self-worth. From the standpoint of the organization, 
young individuals are less likely to be spies and can be more easily molded into the roles 
required by the organization (Hegghammer, 2006). The fact that terrorists are often intelligent, 
well-placed individuals is not really all that surprising when one considers that terrorist 
organizations, like other organizations, acknowledge the value that education and the attainment 
of specific skill sets has in predicting an individual’s ability to plan and carry out complex 
operations (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Hegghammer, 2006; Krueger & Malecova, 2003; 
Laqueur & Wall, 2018).  
 
Terrorists’ Personal History 
 
The factors in a person’s life that compels them to become a terrorist are a chain of highly 
complex motivators that are interwoven into people’s psychological and social development. In 
terms of psychological factors, researchers have generally determined that very few terrorists can 
be classified as being mentally disturbed, at least in the traditional sense of having officially 
recognized mental health diagnoses (Becker, 2014; Laqueur & Wall, 2018). However, several 
researchers have determined that lone wolf terrorists have a higher probability of having mental 
health diagnoses than group-based terrorists (Corner & Gill, 2015; Hewitt, 2003). For example, 
Corner and Gill (2015) concluded that the rate of mental illness for lone wolf terrorists was 
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31.9% compared with 3.4% for group-based terrorists among the individuals in their study’s 
sample. One possible explanation for this finding is that individuals with mental illnesses are 
more likely to be rejected by terrorist recruiters because recruiters believe that these individuals’ 
mental states make them unfit to join their organization. Despite this rejection, such people often 
maintain their fervent devotion to the terrorist cause, and therefore, decide to carry out attacks on 
their own without any assistance from the organization they once tried to join (Jones, 2017).   
In terms of sociological factors, most people become terrorists due to their devotion to a 
radical cause; although, the exact degree of their devotion varies from person to person. Still, an 
intense devotion to a particular radical cause is not, by itself, a sufficient explanation as to why 
an individual decides to become a terrorist since many people are intensely aligned with all sorts 
of radical causes who never resort to terrorism. Three other common factors that help prime 
people to become terrorists are personal grievances, personal relationships, and thrill and status 
seeking motivations. For instance, some people join terrorist organizations due to wanting to take 
revenge against their government because of a personal injury (personal grievance), some join 
because a person they care about (e.g., friend, relative, romantic partner) is a member of the 
group and recruits them (personal relationship), and some join in search of excitement, status, or 
money (thrill and status seeking motivations) (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011). Laqueur and 
Wall (2018) note that historically speaking, the one main commonality that helps to designate 
whether a person becomes a terrorist is if they have a family member or friend already involved 
in the cause. Another major commonality identified by the other was that terrorists often reflect 
the best and brightest of their society when accounting for their education levels and the fact that 
most come from middle to upper-class family backgrounds. However, despite these advantages, 
they find themselves feeling extremely isolated and alienated from the society in which they live.  
 
Terrorists’ Recruitment-Radicalization Processes  
 
Although at first glance, the recruitment and radicalization processes that turn people into 
terrorists may seem indistinguishable from one another, and indeed, the two concepts often 
coincide with each other, recruitment and radicalization are actually two separate things. 
Recruitment refers to the specific process through which un-initiated individuals are courted and 
assessed for their potential value to a terrorist organization by individuals who are already 
established members of that organization. Radicalization is the process that occurs when an 
individual’s belief system is modified in order to align it with the doctrine of the terrorist 
organization (Jones, 2017).  
 
Recruitment. To understand terrorist recruitment, it is helpful to consider that, just like other 
kinds of organizations, terrorist organizations have specific criteria regarding the types of 
individuals they want to recruit. As such, for the purposes of resource allocation and cost-saving 
measures, terrorist organizations seek to focus their recruiting efforts on the type of individuals 
they predict will be the most productive members of their organization (Hunter, Shortland, 
Cryane, & Ligon, 2017). There is evidence that terrorist organizations look for people with 
certain personality traits as well. For example, an al-Qaida manual known as the Manchester 
Manual outlines 14 different qualities desirable in potential recruits including (e.g., intelligence, 
maturity, truthfulness, the ability to observe, and the ability to conceal oneself) (Hegghammer, 
2006). To this end, terrorist organizations do not seek to recruit just anyone, but instead pre-
screen potential recruits to verify that they have the proper personality traits and knowledge 
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regarding the organization’s cause, ideology, and history. Likewise, Terrorist recruiters use a 
variety of methods to try and quantifying that individuals are competent in the special skills 
required to carry out combat operations (e.g., weapons, tactics, bomb-making) and for daily 
activities (e.g., computer engineering, and social media skills) (Hegghammer, 2006). This idea is 
expanded even further by the understanding that individuals are recruited to hold multiple and 
changing roles within a terrorist organization. Which means that the process of recruitment and 
selection fluctuates based on the role or roles the prospective recruit will hold in the organization 
(Horgan, Shortland, Abbasciano, & Walsh, 2016; Hunter et al., 2017). 
Although it seems that terrorist recruiters use many of the same techniques and standards 
when initiating people to their organization that legitimate organizations do when searching for 
new employees, it is quite apparent that the factors that drive a person to become a terrorist are 
substantially different from those that compel people to apply for traditional occupations such as 
a banker, firefighter, or nurse. On many levels, being a terrorist is not a particularly enviable way 
for one to live their life. Terrorism, by its very nature, does not allow its adherents to live a 
conventional lifestyle that most people desire and are afforded. Not to mention, people engaged 
in terrorism have to live most of their lives in hiding from authorities, are often subjugated to 
lengthy prison terms, and have a very high probability of being killed at an early age.  
Currently, the hypotheses explaining why people become terrorists are divided into push 
and pull factors. Push factors have to do with the social, economic, and political forces which 
cause people to see society as unjust and discriminatory, and that fosters their aspirations to take 
violent action against those they believe have wronged them and what they stand for.  Pull 
factors have to do with the innate human desires to want to belong to a higher cause, to seek out 
adventures, and to do something worthwhile with one’s life (Jones, 2017). In this way, the 
process of terrorist recruitment is often encompassed within the grand narrative that portrays 
society as being  terminally flawed (push factors) and the individual terrorist as having a moral 
duty to go on a heroic quest to right the wrongs imposed on them and their people by the unjust 
powers that be (pull factors). Such a narrative is especially appealing to young recruits because it 
offers them the opportunity to shed their old identity for a new emboldened one (Choudry, 2007; 
Pfundmair, Aßmann, Kiver, Penzkofer, Scheuermeyer, Sust, & Schmidt, 2019). An identity that 
induces complete loyalty to the terrorist organization because it is empowered by the level of 
devotion that recruits have to the sacred values inscribed in the terrorist ideology (Atran, 2010).   
 
Radicalization. The process through which an individual is radicalized can happen gradually 
with a tipping point culminating in their final transition or may be achieved within a short period 
of time. In terms of terrorism, radicalization is the progression from feeling sympathy towards a 
terrorist cause to the direct Matusitz, 2020). involvement in such activities (Neumann, 2013). 
Generally, radicalization can happen in one of two ways: top-down or bottom-up.  Top-down 
occurs when new recruits are gradually radicalized through a structuralized recruiting and 
training process. An example of a top-down approach would be when recruits attend a terrorist 
training camp where they undergo extensive training in military tactics, are indoctrinated in the 
ideology of the group and begin to form personal bonds with other members of the group 
(Hegghammer, 2006). Bottom-up refers to situations where individuals first self-radicalize and 
then intentionally seek out a recruiter with the intentions of joining the terrorist organization 
(Hegghammer, 2006). This process of self-radicalization is becoming more and more prevalent 
today through the widespread use of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and WhatsApp by terrorist groups (Edwards & Gribbon, 2013). By using social media 
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in this way, terrorist organizations are now able to connect with potential recruits all over the 
world without having to meet with them face-to-face (Toevs, 2020). Through the use of such 
technologies as encryption software and the dark web, extremists are now able to create virtual 
environments where they can freely and covertly spread ideas that are unacceptable in open-
society, to people all across the globe with little fear of being intercepted by government forces 
(Neumann, 2012). 
 
Terrorist Typologies  
 
As discussed in the introduction, terrorism exists in many different forms in terms of ideological 
motivations, organizational structure, tactics and overall objectives.  At its most basic level, 
terrorism should not be viewed as a single ideological perspective adopted by a particular type of 
organization, but rather as a method of operation assumed by a variety of organizations to 
advance their specific causes forward (Kis-Katos, Liebert & Schulze, 2012; Laqueur, 2003; 
Mullins & Thurman, 2011). Given these distinctions, it is essential to classify terrorists into 
different typologies in order to find out what characteristics are transferable across different time 
periods and locations and which ones are unique to the specific context in which they exist. 
However, due to its ever-evolving nature, terrorism is notoriously difficult to classify. Take for 
example that back in 1988, when the classification of terrorist organizations was just starting to 
develop in the empirical literature, Schmid and Jongman identified as many as 31 different 
typologies of terrorism.  
Generally, most large-scale assessments have tended to focus their level of analysis at the 
group-level and classify terrorist organizations primarily based on their origin or ideological 
motivations – such as far-right, Marxist, nationalists, single issue (e.g., anti-abortionist and 
environmentalists), and religious extremists (Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007; Chermak & 
Greuenewald, 2015; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism [START], 2018; Piazza, 2009). Another popular method for classifying terrorism is to 
make divisions based on historical movements (e.g., anarchism, anti-colonialism, left-wing 
radicalism, and religious terrorism) (Rapoport, 2001). While such classification methods are 
advantageous for their sharp, clear distinctions, they also tend to exclude the intricate details that 
help to explain how different version of terrorism both match and differ from one another 
(Chenoweth & Lowham, 2007). To help prevent these intricate details from being lost, it seems 
appropriate to shift the level of analysis away from the group and towards the individual level 
when attempting to divide terrorism into typologies. However, attempts to classify terrorists into 
typologies according to individual characteristics of its practitioner is largely absent from the 




In this exploratory study the following three research questions were asked:  
 
Q 1:  How many primary typologies of terrorism exist in the United States based on the 
profiles of individual terrorist who operated in the United States from 1948 – 2016? 
 
Q 2:  In what ways are terrorists from different typologies similar to one another? 
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The current study is based on data obtained from the (PIRUS) dataset, which is a publically 
available dataset operated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. It provides individual-level information on 
the backgrounds, attributes, and radicalization processes for over 1,800 violent and non-violent 
extremists who operated in the United States from 1948 – 2016 (National Consortium for the 




In order to classify individual extremists into terrorist typologies, I utilized the Statistical 
Software Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to conduct a two-step cluster analysis. Cluster 
analysis is an exploratory data mining technique used to discover naturally occurring groups 
within complex datasets so that data may be retrieved, understood, and evaluated in a quick and 
easy manner. (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). Cluster analysis works towards dividing 
cases according to their similarity on one or more dimensions, and thus, produces groups where 
the objects within the group are more similar to each other than to those in other groups 
(Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990). Two-step cluster analysis, was chosen for this study because 
the algorithm that it employees has several features not possible with traditional clustering 
techniques. More specifically, I chose this clustering technique based on three main features. 
One, by constructing a cluster features (CF) tree that summarizes all records, two-step clustering 
is uniquely compatible with large datasets such as the one used in this study. Second, by using a 
log-likelihood measure, it assumes all variables to be independent and places a normal 
distribution on continuous variables and a multinomial distribution on categorical variables, thus, 
making it capable of handling both types of variables simultaneously. Third, by comparing the 
values of a model-choice criterion across different clustering solutions, the procedure 
automatically determines the optimal number of clusters (“TwoStep Cluster Analysis,” n.d.). 18 
separate variables were entered into the analysis based on three different dimensions of the 
terrorist profile: demographics, personal factors, and recruitment-radicalization processes. The 
demographics dimension looks at the identifying characteristics of individuals such as religion, 
age, marital status, etc. The personal factors dimension may be defined as key factors in an 
individual’s history that can act as predictors of their future behavior such as mental illness, 
criminal history, drug use and military history. The recruitment-radicalization processes 
dimension considers the manner in which an individual was recruited and the process by which 
they were radicalized into becoming a terrorist. This is measured through such factors as their 
ideology, beliefs, and the length of their radicalization process. Table 1 displays each of the 18 









Using the study’s criterion, the two-step cluster analysis compared values across different 
clustering solutions to determine that the optimum number of clusters for this dataset is two. This 
means that each case was reported to fit into one of two clusters, with 48.1% (41 cases) fitting 
into the first group and 51.9% (38 cases) fitting into the second group. This finding indicates that  
 
Table 1 
18 Variables Used in the Cluster Analysis in Accordance with Their Profile Dimension 
Demographics Personal Factors  Recruitment-Radicalization Processes 
Religious Background Previous Criminal Activity Terrorist Ideology 
Ethnicity Alcohol/Drug abuse Radical Beliefs 
Time in the U.S. Military History Radicalization Duration 
Age Mental Illness Radical Behaviors 
Marital Status  Media Radicalization 
Number of Children   
Level of Education   
Social Stratum   
Employment Status   
Table 2 
Two-Step Cluster Analysis Results 
Variables Cluster 1 (51.9% = 41 Cases) Cluster 2 (48.1% = 38 Cases) 
Religious Background Unspecified Christianity (29.3%) Sunni Islam (42.1%) 
Time in the U.S.   (379.37 Months)  (215.29 Months) 
 Ethnicity  
 




Far-Right (34.1%) Islamic (92.1%) 
Age 
 
33.27 yrs. old  25.26 yrs. old  
Radical Beliefs 
 
Deep commitment to radical 
ideological beliefs (70.7%) 
Shared many of the same 
beliefs of radical ideology 
(28.9%) 
Previous Criminal Activity  None (46.3%) None (89.5%)  
Social Stratum  Middle-Class (46.3%) Middle-Class (84.2%) 
Marital Status  Married (48.8%) Single (65.8%) 
Radicalization Duration Long (53.7%) Medium (57.9%) 
Number of Children  None (31.7%) None (73.7%) 
Radical Behaviors  Active participant in operations 
intended to cause casualties 
(61%) 
Active participant in 
operations intended to cause 
casualties (42.1%) 
Alcohol/Drug Abuse None (65.9%) None (86.8%) 
Employment Status  Employed (46.3%) Employed (65.8%) 
Media Radicalization None (39%) None (50%) 
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there are mainly two overarching typologies of terrorism based on the profile characteristics of 
individual terrorists. Table 2 presents each of the 18 variables entered into the analysis along 
with its most frequent value for the cases in that cluster. The variables are shown in rank order, 
ranging from the variable with the most predictive power (religious background) at the top to the 
variable with the least predictive power (psychological history) at the bottom. 
The following sections describe in detail how cases were categorized based on 
similarities and differences among each of the variables. The reader will note that the divisions 




With regard to religious background, the majority of cases in cluster 1 fell into one of several 
different Christian denominations, with a good portion being Jewish or new religion 
(Scientology, Satanic, New Age, etc.) while the majority of cases in cluster 2 were classified into 
one of several types of Islamic denominations. With regard to ethnicity, a vast majority of 
terrorists in cluster 1 were white while the majority of terrorists in cluster 2 were identified as 
being Middle Eastern/North African. It is notable that ethnicity within cluster 2 was more 
diversified than that of cluster 1, with a large number of cases being identified as being Asian 
and a smaller number identified as Black or White. Concerning time spent in the U.S., terrorists 
in cluster 1 tended to live in the U.S. for a longer period of time before public exposure than 
those in cluster 2 (379.37 months versus 215.29 months). With regard to age, terrorists in cluster 
1 tended to be older than those in cluster 2 (33.27 yrs. versus 25.26 yrs.).  In terms of marital 
status, the majority of cases in cluster 1 were married, with the next largest portion being single. 
In cluster 2, the majority of cases were shown to be single with next largest portion being 
married. In terms of their number of children, the majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 had 
no children, although, a large number of cases in cluster 1 did have at least one child. With 
concern to their level of education, the majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 tended to have 
at least some college or vocational training, although, the cases in cluster 2 were slightly more 
likely to have advance degrees. Concerning what social stratum they came from, cases in cluster 
1 tended to be in the low to middle-class stratum while a large majority of cases in cluster 2 were 
in the middle-class stratum. In terms employment status, the majority of cases in both clusters 1 
and 2 were found to be employed; however, a good portion of cases in cluster 1 were 
unemployed while almost all cases in cluster 2 were employed.   
 
Personal History  
 
Concerning their previous criminal activity, the majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 had no 
previous criminal activity prior to radicalization, although, a fair portion of individuals in cluster 
1 did have a history of both violent and non-violent crime, while very few individuals in cluster 2  
had any  previous history of criminality. With concern to their alcohol/drug abuse history, the 
majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 had no history of abuse, although, a fair amount of 
cases in cluster 1 did have a history of abuse. Regarding their military history, very few 
Military History  None (75.6%) None (92.1%) 
Level of Education Some College (36.6%) High school diploma (31.6%) 
Mental Illness  None (73.2%) None (78.9%) 
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individuals in both clusters 1 and 2 had history in the military. Likewise, this was the case for 
their history of mental illness.  
 
Recruitment-Radicalization Processes  
 
With concern to terrorist ideology, a slight majority of individuals in cluster 1 were radicalized 
into far-right movements; however, cases were distributed proportionally with a good number of 
individuals radicalized into radical-Islamic, far-left, and single-issue ideologies. However, this 
was not the case for cluster 2 where almost all of the cases were radicalized into a radical-Islamic 
ideology. In terms of the amount if radicalization that was evident in the individual’s belief 
system, the majority of people in cluster 1 had a deep commitment to their radical ideological 
beliefs. The majority of people in cluster 2 were slightly less committed in terms of how their 
personal beliefs reflected the radical ideology they professed.  Concerning the duration of their 
radicalization process, the majority of cases in cluster 1 were radicalized over a long period of 
time with a good number of cases radicalized over a medium period of time. The majority of 
cases in cluster 2 were radicalized for a medium period of time with good portion radicalized 
over short and long time spans. In regards to radical behaviors, the majority of cases in both 
clusters 1 and 2 actively participated in terrorist plots in which they intended to bring about the 
death of others in a direct manner, while a smaller proportion of cases played roles in terror plots 
that would not make them directly responsible for causing the death of others. Regarding the role 
that the media played in their radicalization process, the media played no role in the radical 
process for a slight majority of cases in both clusters 1 and 2 and did play at least some role for a 




The two cluster solution regarding the number terrorist typologies present in the data was an 
unexpected finding. Given the long time span that the dataset covered, the amount of diversity 
within the individual profiles, and the number of different variables entered into the model, I 
fully believed that the number of clusters found in the data would be greater than two. However, 
after careful inspection of the data, I’ve reached the conclusion that the results reveal many sharp 
distinctions between variables that would most likely have been mitigated if the cases would 
have been divided into more than two clusters. Therefore, I am in agreement with the findings 
that a two cluster solution is the best answer for the dataset, and is in accordance with what past 
researchers have said about the differences in the typologies of terrorism.  
The cleavages made between the variables of each group reveal that, broadly speaking, 
there are two distinct terrorist typologies that exist in the United States. Individuals in cluster 1 
can most appropriately be classified as being older, white, mainly associate with a denomination 
of Christianity, who have lived in the U.S. for a long period of time, and whose extremist 
ideology is mainly driven by nationalistic and political factors. Individuals in cluster 2 tended to 
be younger, of Middle-Eastern or North African descent, lived in the U.S. for a shorter period of 
time than those in cluster 1, and had an extremist ideology which can most appropriately be 
classified as being religiously motivated. These typologies draw a line between what has been 
described as being the traditional politically motivated version of terrorism and religious 
extremism or what has also been called the new face of terrorism (Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur & 
Wall, 2018; Rapoport, 2001).   
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Those who fit into the politically motivated version of terrorism use violence as a 
revolutionary means to bring about clearly defined changes to the current political order. 
Whether their political ideology is from the far-right (e.g., anti-government and white 
supremacists), far-left (Marxist-Leninists), or based on a single issue (e.g., anti-abortionist and 
environmentalists), these individuals seem best described as being spurred on by political issues. 
Currently, in the United States, this type of terrorist is best represented by the far-right in such 
forms as anti-government militias and white nationalists. However, in the past, this typology has 
been represented by far-left groups such as the Weather Underground.  
Those individuals who may be described as being religious extremists misuse and abuse 
religious doctrine in order to attract recruits from all over the globe towards a universal cause 
that transcends language, culture, and political ideology. This mode of terrorism does not intend 
to re-order an existing secular political order so that it can be brought into alignment with what 
they perceive to be a justified political structure, but rather, they deny any type of secular 
political order to be justified. To them, the only law that has any validity is the law of God 
(Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur & Wall, 2018; Rapoport, 2001). Therefore, the focus of such terrorists 
is not on the political structure but rather on the individual person. Their primary mission is to 
have all humanity embrace the only true ideology and those who refuse to do so should be 
eliminated, or at least, relegated to second or third-class citizenship for their unbelief (Hoffman, 
1998; Laqueur & Wall, 2018; Rapoport, 2001).  
Before proceeding forward, it is worth pausing for a moment in order to fully clarify four 
essential aspects of these typologies. First, the religious extremist typology does not consist 
exclusively of radical jihadists. Historically speaking the Zealots of ancient Judea, the Shiite 
Assassins in Persia during the Crusades, the Thuggee cult of India, and the Aum Shinrikyo cult, 
which orchestrated sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, all fit into this 
classification of terrorism as well (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). However, it is clearly evident that 
radical jihadism is the most dominant version of religious extremism that currently exists in the 
United States and other parts of the world, with very little competition on the horizon threatening 
to upstage its reign.  
Second, the characteristics of these typologies is not in any way mutually-exclusive to 
one another, but instead exist between typologies within a proportional scale. Although it is true 
that religious extremism is the primary motive of radical jihadists, this is an oversimplification of 
the problem. Radical jihadist movements also have a powerful presence in the political sphere. 
For example, during the Islamic State’s (IS) brief territorial rule over failed-states such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan, it engaged in such overtly political operations as reformulating laws according 
to sharia, implementing a system for taxation , debating health care policy, and implementing a 
new court system (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). Moreover, in many cases, there is a strong religious 
influence among politically motivated terrorists. Far-right terrorist groups in the United States 
have had an historical connection with Christianity. The Ku Klux Klan, anti-government militias, 
anti-Semitic groups, and white nationalists are just a few examples of terrorists who misuse 
elements of Christian doctrine to help justify their extremist views. 
Third, the two typologies are not entirely homogenous. That is to say, the two typologies 
created in the cluster analysis represent the most prominent distinctions that can be made 
between the variables at the aggregate level, but the individuals within each cluster still contain 
many micro-level differences when compared to other members of that group. For instance, the 
cases within cluster 1 could be further sub-divided into right-wing, left-wing, and single-issue 
extremists. Moreover, even though the ideology for the vast majority of cases in cluster 2 can be 
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classified as being part of the radical jihadist movement, this movement is far from uniform. For 
example, there was considerable differences of opinion among the top leadership of the Islamic 
State and al-Qaeda over such issues as how to treat non-Sunni Muslims and what constitutes 
religious orthodoxy, which eventually caused a schism between the two groups and has even led 
to them fighting one another within the various Middle-Eastern conflicts that have emerged in 
the post-Arab Spring world (Laqueur & Wall, 2018). 
Fourth, there are many characteristics that terrorists in both typologies have in common. 
For instance, many terrorists in both groups tended to have a strong commitment to radical 
ideological beliefs, had no previous history of criminal activity, came from middle-class or a 
higher social stratum, had some history of employment, had no history of drug or alcohol abuse, 
had no history of military service, had no history of mental illness, and had a high school 
diploma – with many having some college experience.  Such findings are in keeping with what 
other researchers have also determined about the common characteristics of terrorists – the most 
significant being that they are often highly intelligent individuals, from middle to upper-class 
backgrounds, not suffering from clinical mental illness (Berrebi, 2007; Chermak & Gruenwald, 
2015; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Laqueur & Wall, 2018; Sageman, 2008). This of course is 
not a surprising conclusion given that terrorist operations are often very complex undertakings 
requiring a great deal of preparation, strategic and tactical planning, technical knowledge, and 





The primary limitation of this study is that it focused exclusively on a sample of terrorists within 
in a single country, the United States. Because modern terrorist movements are certainly not 
confined to any one country, but instead, exist globally, it is reasonable to assume that the social 
environmental characteristics of any single county have a unique and significant impact on the 
manner in which terrorists exist in that country. As such, the results from this study are not 
directly applicable to terrorism in countries outside the United States. Even so, the study’s 
findings are in alignment with what other researchers have said about the sharp distinctions 
between political and religious terrorists when commenting on terrorism outside of the United 
States (Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur & Wall, 2018; Piazza, 2009; Rapoport, 2001). Still, I suggest a 
great deal of caution be used with regard to generalizing these results to populations outside of 
the United States. 
Suggestions for Future Research  
 
This study based its classification of terrorists on three dimensions: demographics, personal 
history, and recruitment-radicalization processes. However, this is only one of many methods 
that can be used to classify terrorism. Researchers in the future will do well to consider using 
cluster analysis to group terrorism into typologies using other established criteria. For instance, 
Chenoweth and Lowham (2007) suggest using cluster analysis to develop typologies based on 
the methods and tactics that terrorists use when carrying out their attacks. In this way a more 
comprehensive picture of the varieties of terrorism can be established. In the future, researchers 
should also explore how the behaviour of individual terrorists differ from one another when their 
typology is factored in. One possible avenue for researchers to explore is to look at how 
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typologies impact the degree of formal involvement with a terrorist organization that is necessary 
before an individual attempts to carry out a terrorist attack. For example, the terrorists in one 
typology may be more likely to attempt to carry out an attack with little formal involvement or 
may be willing to act as lone wolves, while terrorists in another typology may not attempt an 
attack until formal connections within an organization have been established. Another possibility 
is to explore the extent to which typology is able to predict the severity of an attack that an 
individual is willing to engage in. These are only a few suggestions among a vast array of 




In this study two-step cluster analysis was used in an exploratory effort to determine what the 
primary typologies of terrorism are in the United States. The study’s findings suggest that the 
United States faces two overarching types of terrorism. The first one can most appropriately be 
classified as political extremism, which currently, is mainly represented by right-wing 
extremists, but has historically involved individuals all across the political spectrum. The second 
typology may be classified as religious extremism, which by in large, are composed of radical 
jihadist, although this is certainly not the only type of religious extremism connected to 
terrorism. This study also concluded that there are many commonalities among terrorists 
regardless of what cluster they fit into. Most notably, terrorists seem to be reasonably intelligent 
individuals, from middle to upper class backgrounds, who do not have a history of mental illness, 
criminal activity, or drug and alcohol abuse. These findings suggest that terrorists carry with 
them unique features that policymakers should be aware of when shaping counterterrorism 
policies. Moreover, policymakers should be aware that terrorists share some common 
characteristics that differentiate them from other types of deviant actors, which suggest that the 
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This article looks at borders during the Covid-19 crisis. In particular, it looks at how internal 
borders have arisen following xenophobic and national responses to Covid-19. This rise of 
internal borders is referred to as the honeycombing of borders. This article takes a genealogical 
approach to understand how borders have arisen—despite not always favorable opinions about 
them. Therefore, this looks at Rancière’s (1999; 2004) concept of the “police order” in the 
imposition of the sensible through Foucault’s genealogical approach, both to show the 
temporary, haphazard nature of these borders and how they revert to less desirable things. This 
is situated within the moment of rightwing populism, where increased prejudice leads to violence 
against everyone. This article uses examples from two rightwing populist countries, Brazil and 
the United States, Australia, which currently has a center-right government and xenophobic 
policies. Japan has had a hegemonic rightwing conservative government. The similarities and 
varieties of these countries show how internal borders vary in different spatial and political 
settings as well as change or persist over time. While these internal borders might suggest power 
concentrating at the local and subnational levels, this article argues that these borders enable 
increased national power. 
 
Keywords: Covid-19, bordering, internal borders, identity-politics, police order, democracy, The 




Between 2000 and 2012, 25 new borders were constructed or “substantially fortified” (Jones 
2012, 11); however, nation-states, who worry about public opinion of these borders, have given 
them different names (Jones, 2912, 11-12). Similarly, something akin to borders, but with a 
different form, has arisen within national territories following the 9-11 attacks. These border-like 
practices  control flows of people and counterterrorism through surveillance at non-official 
borders through biometrics (Epstein 2008) and promote the actions of everyday people, outside 
of work, to defend against international threats—terrorism (Amoore 2008, 113). The bordering 
that accompanies these non-traditional borders, while not consistent, relies on “inscription” of 
physical boundaries through “bordering” which “Operate alone upon human bodies, or even 
human consciousnesses with a view to constituting the spatially bounded entity” (Parker and  
Adler-Nissen 2012, 782). Bordering comes at a contradictory time in national sovereignty. For 
example, Brown (2010) suggests that the proliferation of border walls suggests a response to 
nation-states’ “waning sovereignty.” The historian Greg Grandin (2019) argues that the United 
States managed its domestic problems by expanding its “frontier”—be it national borders or 
international wars of conquest. Trumpism is a response to how the United States has reached the 
limit of expanding frontiers (Grandin 2019). Others have focused on nation-states' internal 
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borders (Sassen 2006) for immigration control far from the national border (Shachar  2019). 
However, these often are not visible but symbolic (Schimanski 2015) or theatric (Amoore and 
Hall 2010). International borders may be places where the often softer domestic policies—
relatively non-violent—meet a violent exterior (Bosniak 2003, 4). While exploring the normative 
value of the U.S.-Mexico borderland, Gloria Anzaldua (1987) also expressed these frontiers as 
places where people suffer. 
 While the potential for violence at borders is known, be it against undocumented 
immigrants or foreign countries, what does it mean for borders to spread internally? How might 
this affect the politics of inequality within nation-states? Can we separate this inequality within 
nation-states from the outside of borders? This article does not refer to internally spreading 
borders as metaphorical or too subtle to miss, but instead policed borders that are almost as easy 
to see as international borders. In this sense, this article departs from much of the previous 
scholarship on bordering. An early iteration of borders modern borders is arguably the quarantine 
(Foucault in Nail 2016) during the virus outbreaks, which created borders within cities, that is, 
borders that kept people in their home, in contrast to city walls, which usually kept invading 
armies out. Therefore, the Covid-19 crisis potentially enables a proliferation of borders within 
nation-states at the subnational, municipal, and local levels, which I refer to as a honeycombing 
of borders. This article explores that. The main argument is that there is an emerging aesthetic 
practice of bordering that enacts real borders within nation-states. Still, this bordering does not 
currently suggest a retreat of national power.  
 This article modifies Jacques Rancière’s (2004) theory of aesthetics as used by rightwing 
governments to create internal borders. These subnational, municipal, and local borders change 
the distribution of the sensible, leading to new expectations of what is acceptable. However, in 
contrast to the more revolutionary arts, they do so in ways that ironically strengthen national, 
military, and police power. Therefore, they are similar to critiques of the use of the arts by 
fascism as a way to enjoy national suicide (Benjamin 1968; also see Deleuze & Guattari 1987). 
These borders give a misleading idea of solving Covid-19. This article will explore this through 
three levels of borders. Nation-state strategies moved from the 1.) international arena—that is, 
blaming other countries (Toohey 2020)—to 2.) the domestic arena in terms of welcoming 
citizens back from international areas of Covid-19 outbreak, to 3.) the local region in terms of an 
aesthetic of subnational, municipal, and local hard borders. The time frame of this article is 
limited to the first nine months of 2020 when Covid-19 spread despite the possibility of it 
containing. It is limited to four democracies with either long-standing rightwing national 
governments, rightwing populist hegemonies, or center-right governments with high levels of 
xenophobia: Japan, The United States, Brazil, and Australia. Examples found in media do not 
necessarily summarize or quantify the typical statements but rather illuminate openings for hard 
borders within nation-states. 
 
Borders, Order, and Identity 
 
Borders can be conceptually related to quarantine. As Thomas Nail (2016) explains, borrowing 
Foucault’s theories, the quarantine was a type of urban bordering which came before the nation-
state’s borders. Therefore, it is at least conceptually possible to move from the idea that people 
should remain within their homes' walls to the idea that a nation-state's walls would be an 
adequate quarantine measure. In February 2020, Giorgio Agamben claimed that Italy was 
suspending democracy, i.e., a “state of exception,” when it restricted movement in areas with 
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Covid-19 (2020). Agamben’s suspicions did not outlast the scant medical evidence given by the 
early, widespread Covid-19 pandemic in Italy. The problem with Agamben’s work is it 
overgeneralizes the state of exception beyond its usually fictitious premises (see Agamben 
2005).  However, his short article foreshadowed the potential of rightwing governance through 
some form of internal borders. Slovac Zizek criticizes assumptions that quarantining within a 
home, or in the face of a medical crisis, imposes on freedom. For Zizek (2020a) “We live a 
paradoxical imperative: we are more solidary, not approaching each other.” Thus, Covid-19 does 
not inevitably lead to a break up of community at the national or local levels as implied by 
bordering. If so, why are people choosing a spread of internal borders? Distance from borders 
provides safety from violence at borders’ exteriors (Bosniak 2003, 4). Dangerous borderland 
existence is not something chosen out of privilege (Gloria Anzaldua (1987).  Zizek (2020b) 
partially answers this through two continuities: 1) the near-identical stages of response to 
pandemics in Medieval times and now (including xenophobia) (51), and 2) “the lesson of 
ecology, which is that we unknowingly can contribute” to our extinction (52). Yet, given the 
increases in education compared to Medieval times, repetition does not make sense on its own. 
The degrading to less advanced times seems like it would need to be imposed to gain acceptance. 
Jacque Rancière’s theories provide some idea of how things become normal, and in another time 
abnormally bad, hence unacceptable. The literature reviewed here explores:1) Rancière’s 
aesthetic and more macropolitical theories and 2) Rancière’s theories' applicability to a 
functional political protest and anti-racist struggle.  
Writing on Rancièrehas focused on the application of aesthetics to literature and film. 
This related more to how literature and film could intervene in politics by “repartitioning the 
possible” (Conley 2005). Vaughan (2014) explains that Rancière’s later work looked at artworks 
as constrained by specific parameters, in ways similar to Immanuel Kant’s theories, albeit with a 
difference in the political stakes of doing away with these seemingly unconscious constraints 
(102-103). 
 Rancière’s concept of the police order implies a similar concept, albeit with inverse 
ethical implications. Common ideas about what is sensible can be changed or sustained without 
liberating people. This negative aspect of what is sensible is more applicable to explaining 
micropolitics than micropolitical analyses of film and literature. For example, Havercroft and 
Owen. (2016) use Rancière’s theories of undoing the “police order” as a way to understand how 
The Black Lives Movement can empower black people without ignoring their identity. This 
focus on Rancière’s “police order” as a conceptual step against oppression does not cancel out 
Rancière’s work on aesthetics. Rancière saw a “messianic” role for film, which would lead to 
“dissensus” that would improve society (Conley 2005, 103). Instead, focusing on the police order 
allows us to illuminate oppression when there are few aesthetic objects about Covid-19 and when 
there does not seem to be many positive sources of repartitioning the possible. 
 Rannciere’s concept of the police as something mental also relates to how the past is 
sustained into the future without requiring overt government intervention. This relates Rancière’s 
ideas to Foucault’s idea of governmentality, which has been described as a way to use non-state 
actors to conduct the nation-state’s agenda in ways that may promote racism (Gressgård 2019, 
14). Thus the police order relates to how people may internalize things. Therefore, Rancière’s 
theories fit with the context of governmentality and in a more nefarious way than Foucault may 
have meant. This article thus breaks some new ground by showing how people internalize modes 
of conflict that harm them.  
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 Rancière’s idea of the police order is also compatible with Foucault's genealogies. These 
genealogies have been argued to illuminate that ideas and practices are situated within specific 
time frames (Shapiro 2016). Like Foucault, Rancière sees aesthetics as determining the form and 
interpretation of arts (Vaughan 2014). The police order concept can foreground the process of 
these ideas and practices changing over time in terms of certain processes, e.g., media iterations, 
etc., while being part of a specific time (Shapiro 2016). Indeed, the police order concept 
illuminates why political potential has mostly enabled undesirable processes (see Berardi 2019). 
 Rancière has been criticized for interpreting identity in ways that assume that people of 
color should, or could leave their identity as assigned in the “distribution of the sensible” to 
become more powerful political subjects (Bromell 2019, 264). Perhaps focusing more on the top-
down, albeit somewhat voluntarily accepted, distribution of the sensible imposed by the police 
order can leave room to understand how racial identities are not left behind at will. Thus, this 
article focuses on involuntary inequality, either due to racial disparities in the initial spread of 
Covid-19, or from the usually involuntary spread of Covid-19. Using some factual data that 
shows this can temper some of the problems of the idea that all identities can be left behind. 
Covid-19 thus assumes more of a need to understand the “police force” rather than a voluntary 
change in the distribution of the sensible. This does not mean that Rancière’s work should be 
abandoned, even his criticized idea of identity. A big part of Rancière’s work is how roles and 
potentials are not chosen. According to Ross, Rancière’s“..examples of political disagreement 
concern the struggle for comprehension in which the very questions of what is at issue in a 
dispute and who is speaking are themselves at stake. There needs to be a redistribution of social 
roles and functions for the disagreement to be visible. In particular, this understanding of politics 
makes it clear that any social order is an imposition of incapacities” (2009, 128-129). Thus, 
Rancière’s aesthetics may lead us to be more conscious of who is speaking or not—that is 
oppressed minorities—and how what seems natural in a conflict is something forced upon us. 
Indeed, Rancière’s aesthetics emerge from his anarchist thought (Perica 2019, 23). Thus, his 
work leaves room for a politics that does not have hierarchies such as race. Rancière’s critique of 
identification results from his view that all of our identities are imposed upon us: “Whereas 
identification seeks recognition by identifying with an identity already in place within a given 
police order where all parts already are counted, subjectification disrupts the police order” 
(Bordg 2017, 459). 
 The effectiveness of Rancière’s work in application to real-world events is debatable. 
Todd May situates Rancere’s work within anarchist thought, but in a way that does not make 
political agenda, thus avoiding the trap of Marxism which creates oppression while trying to 
liberate (2007a, 21-22). Perica (2019, 23) makes a similar point. Laurence Piper (2017) has not 
that while Rancière’s idea of disruption influenced The Occupy movement and the South African 
#Fees Must Fall protest, these movements suffered from the lack of focus on politics. Perhaps 
here, the police order idea applies better than Rancière’s other theories because it allows a focus 
on what is happening outside of disruptive politics without forcing an agenda. To explain how 
the police order applies to bordering during Covid-19 does not imply an agenda perse. A plan 
can be decided later, albeit with more focus on policies and institutions than afforded by an 
analysis of film or protest disruption afforded by Rancière’s other theories. Of course, I am not to 
say that analyzing film and disruption is not political and has nothing to offer, but to say that 
analyzing policy may offer some temporary resolve to some debates between scholars of 
Rancière. Within this temporary resolve, there is room to identify problems that lead to 
oppression and consider why people might accept them. 
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 The literature reviewed here shows how Rancière’s theories apply to understanding both 
aesthetics and politics and, to some extent, racism, though his identity concept merits caution. 
This article adds to this by applying Rancière’s work to bordering during Covid-19 through a 
genealogical approach. While I am not the first to consider the possibility, the simultaneous 
application of Rancière and Foucault’s theories to a detailed factual study of how people choose 
the negative aspects and realities of formerly international borders within their community 




A significant concept in this article’s theoretical approach is what Rancière (1999; 2004) calls 
the police order (which is different from a police officer or police department). This concept is 
simar to Galtung’s (1990) “negative peace,” i.e.,  the police force is manifest even when violence 
and authoritarian behavior are not so apparent. However, a significant difference is that the 
police force is likely to precipitate the worst excesses of governance. Within the police order’s 
nonlethal calls for respecting consensus lurks a logic of unwelcoming the outsider that lurks at 
the philosophical heart of Western xenophobia and atrocities (Rancière 1999). As Rancière 
(2004, 89) explains: “Exclusion refers to “the  police distribution of the sensible by the 
subjectivization of those who have no part in it” (85). This “police” exists “as a general law that 
determines the distribution of parts and roles in a community as well as its forms of exclusion, 
the police is first and foremost an organization of ‘bodies’ based on a communal distribution of 
the sensible.” The crucial point here is that by being part of the sensible, problems caused by the 
police order may not be the type that ethical people would be able to identify and protest. These 
practices can operate at a level below normal perception. A conceptual task of this article is to 
expose some of these problems. To understand that the police order is a method of internal 
bordering during Covid-19 is to extend the timeframe of this bordering beyond the pandemic and 
to be able to link these problems conceptually to other problems. 
This article follows the following conceptual framework: 1) there is a limited scale 
genealogy of how internal borders are discussed, and 2), there is an approach that looks at how 
spaces created by these internal borders determine some populations to be valid and others 
invalid, and 3) these problems are put into a short-term specificity using contemporary theories 
of rightwing populism, and 4) this article shows how these problems thought to be only of 
rightwing populism are persistent both in time and other types of government than democracy. 
This article and a forthcoming article (Toohey 2021) conduct a limited scale genealogy of 
Covid-19. The newness of the Covid-19 pandemic prevents a longer timescale. In response to 
discourse, many may expect the accumulation of facts, i.e., a vast “corpus” (Foucault 1989a, 31), 
or mistakenly look for “resemblance or repetition” (Foucault 1989, 24). However, discourse is an 
unthought way of speaking that sets rules of conduct (Foucualt 1989a). One might object that 
this article should have a quantitative set of a large number of actions or statements by the petit 
police or newspaper coverage related to internal borders. Foucault explains that we do not find 
discourse through an author’s oeuvre (1989a)—in this case, journalists—and instead look for a 
“statement” and what it “excludes” (Foucault 1989a, 30-31). Discourse is not about infinitely 
repeating something with “an origin,” but rather its occurrence in a particular time (Foucault 
1989a, 28). “Regularity” is a crucial component (Foucault 1989a, 41). In other words, this article 
conducts a small-scale genealogy to understand what has become regular in reporting on Covid 
and the police-order. Therefore, this article explores how these unacknowledged rules are 
24 David E. Toohey 
communicated to effectively influence peoples’ conduct (Foucault 1989a, 232), where we can 
go, who should go there, etc. However, this is mixed with Rancière’s theories because these rules 
of conduct contain a process of setting divisions of populations—into dangerous or safe—based 
on a supposed consensus (1999). Moreover, the limited duration of the Covid-19 pandemic is 
augmented by the longer timeframe of bordering; studies mentioned earlier in this article help 
show the likely nature and impact of Covid-19 internal bordering  
May (2007b, 135) argues that Foucault's genealogy is useful to determine how 
“dangerous” something is by situating it within its “history and character.” While internal 
bordering as a response to Covid-19 presently lacks a long history—compared to Foucault's 
genealogies of prisons, madness, sexuality, etc.—there are two fixes to this. First, bordering, as 
outlined at the beginning of this article, has a long history. Therefore the general history and 
character can serve as a genealogy for Covid-19 internal bordering. Thus, we can expect 
violence, nationalism, and racism from Covid-19 internal bordering. Second, Rancière’s 
theorization of the police force relies on more than two millennia of political thought. Thus, the 
police order aspect beginning with ancient Greek political thought, can serve as a long-term 
genealogy to determine the likely history and character of police-order internal bordering during 
Covid-19. 
 Regularity in heterogeneous situations can be found within authoritarian practices within 
democracies, but also in actual authoritarian practices. As per authoritarian practices within 
democracies, there is the persistent unwelcoming of the stranger (Rancière 1999) and the 
sometimes invisible borders that keep ethnic and racial minorities out of white parts of the city. 
As per authoritarian bordering, there is the unwelcoming of the stranger, equivocally both a 
citizen and a colonial subject. An example of this dual process is The Peoples’ Republic of China 
continued detention, relocation, and forced abandonment of culture during the Covid-19 
pandemic of Tibetans and Ulghers (BBC  2020b). A similar process occurred as a continuation 
of authoritarian relations with indigenous people in a country relapsing into authoritarian rule. 
Brazil’s policy to exploit gold in the Amazon, against indigenous peoples' wishes, has spread 
Covid-19 to Yanomami communities (Phillips 2020). None of these processes happened because 
of Covid-19. Still, the spatial bordering that devalues the voices—i.e., the police order—has 
become even more deadly with the pandemic's spread. Politicians will no doubt avoid taking 
responsibility for claiming it is accidental. But one could also see a similar process in the Dakota 
Access Pipeline in indigenous peoples lands both before and after Trump’s presidency in The 
United States. Indeed, the simultaneous embrace and unwelcoming of strangers is familiar to 
immigrants in democratic nation-states before the current authoritarian turn (see Balibar 1991). 
Suffice to say, all of these processes go on, not always with citizens’ acknowledgment or 
participation, but neither with the average non-affected citizens’ opposition or rejection refusing 
to allow identification with perpetrators as fellow citizens over such atrocities. The latter is a 
solution that Rancière (1991) offers to the ills of democracy.  
 Rancière has critiqued using the term “populist” (2021); however, I use some 
contemporary work on rightwing populist to address a couple of things that Rancière’s work 
does not help us see. The first is the top-down split between rural and urban people. While 
Rancière’s work addresses this, he does so by discussing Classical Greek philosophy, with a 
notion of the city which is somewhat different from what is occurring. Thus, the idea of the 
countryside having power over some city residents authorized by wealthy elites in the city, not 
fully explored in Dis-Agreement. Indeed, much of Rancière’s work in Dis-agreement focuses on 
contemporary France and may only conceptually apply to other countries. Despite these 
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differences, this article avoids the short-termism of many contemporary analyses on populism. 
Raanciere’s work is thus focused on more because he looks at “post-democracy” and its failings 
in neo-liberal France and the long-term fake-democracies that have persisted for more than two 
millennia. Yet, how may these ideas relate to the present and future? 
 Rancière (January 21, 2021) illuminated how racist violence intensified by Trumpism is 
intentional and part-and-parcel of preexisting desires to see others as inferior. Though it is my 
interpretation based on his work, this process could exist outside of democracy. First of all, by 
basing his theories on classical philosophy, Rancière shows that the problems of democracy that 
seem new are part of persistent violence: creating Others ineligible for fundamental rights 
(1999). This timeframe includes governments that were in no way modern pluralist democracies. 
The time frame would have to include The Dark Ages and Medieval Europe (though Rancière 
skips these eras).
1
 Since the problems of anti-democratic politics that Rancière mentions span a 
timeframe that included other forms of governance, they could apply to other less than 
democratic nation-states—e.g., Hungary, Poland, Brazil, or India that often prioritize religious 
identity over democratic freedoms—and to authoritarian countries like The Peoples’ Republic of 
China. This article does not mention all of these cases in detail. Still, it acknowledges them, 
which extends the scope of this article to future studies of the police order in authoritarian 
countries, thereby augmenting the genealogical approach by extending the discussion beyond the 
topical constraints of Covid-19. 
 Rancière’s theories are useful for promoting peace for two reasons. The first is the police 
order concept spotlights how groups that are not rightwing populists may inadvertently aid 
rightwing populism during rightwing populism. Secondly, understanding the police order is to 
identify conflict practices that may be subtle and occurring before and after rightwing 
governance.  
The police order identifies how society decides, somewhat unconsciously, which 
populations are influential and not and distributes them in space. However, unlike identifying 
only the most egregious spatial practices—segregation, apartheid, prisons, border walls, forced 
migration—the police order concept also can illuminate more subtle forms of discriminatory 
oppression. Resultingly, if we are aware of the police order distribution-of-the-sensible, we can 
see connections between the treatment of African Americans, women, Tibetans, Ainu, and 
LGBTQ people. The connection is that they are designated as not fully part of their respective 
societies and thus show that they correspond to denigrated spaces, if not outright exiled from 
their countries. However, the police order also shows things that people miss. As Rancière 
explains, under the guise of equality, this can be the designation and divide between women who 
nurture (boy) children who may become politicians—the implications being that women’s 
exclusion from the spaces of democratic decisionmaking (1999, 41-42). But it could also detect 
something more subtle, sometimes less offensive, the idea that the professor only should speak in 
a classroom. In contrast, the student should passively listen and absorb knowledge. This latter 
example may or may not shape the students into passive, authoritarian roles later in life. What is 
important is how the police order concept links together modes of oppression with sharply 
contrasting amounts of severity; the student with a strict, unconcerned teacher is not as oppressed 
as someone forced to migrate from their country. However, both show undemocratic practices. 
It is tempting to conclude that it is just rightwing or authoritarian politics that ruins 
democracy by enacting the police order. However, there is a danger of inadvertently participating 
in rightwing populism and other forms of authoritarianism. Some police order activities are more 
palatable, even desirable, but should not be accepted (Rancière 1999, 31). One example is how 
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mass media sometimes broadcasts rightwing messages, which this article explores. Fox News or 
fake news outlets that broadcast partisan news are unequivocally rightwing. Therefore, it is 
essential to monitor what they are doing. It is nevertheless crucial to recognize how “liberal” 
news outlets may aid oppression. Before rightwing populism, many U.S. liberal politicians and 
news networks gave into rightwing discourse. In search of a compromise consensus with 
rightwing politicians, their statements supported invading and occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, 
sacrificing civil liberties to fight The War on Terror, and accepting anti-immigration 
discrimination. Yet, the New Left has also accidentally participated in more subtle ways in 
conservative media spectacles by adapting to violent protest imagery, thus self-marginalizing the 
anti-war movement (Gitlin 2003). A lesson from the above is people more inclined to promote 
peace and civil rights may give in to oppressive power structures even in a more benevolent 
political situation. The police order helps us think through this inconvenient fact. The rightwing 
populist ideologies that arose during democracy—and with any luck—will fade away in 
democracies rather than through violent authoritarian governments and war. Therefore, it is 
crucial to know the fault-lines of democracy. 
In order to search for these fault lines, this article looks for a heterogenous regularity. 
That is a regularity beyond resemblance (Foucault 1989a, 76). Instead of looking for examples of 
the police order that are overtly violent or subtly violent, this article looks for both. This 
regularity can be seen as an extension of bordering away from national borders and anti-
immigration measures, to its fringe existence where it claims not to be: inside nation-states. 
Thus, this article is not merely about the Covid-19 pandemic but extends upon a long-standing 
problem: borders. 
  
Welcoming Citizens Home from International Infection Areas 
 
When receiving citizens returning from Covid-19 hotspots, governments often eschewed medical 
science in favor of actions that promoted an idea of safety from infection within national borders. 
This process sometimes favored national citizens at the expense of foreign citizens, though it 
began with an initial distrust of returning emigres or repatriated. The quarantines operated 
somewhat like internal borders. 
Little information about Covid-19 existed at the beginning of the crisis. The lack of 
information does not imply victimization on the part of national governments. In 2016, The 
Obama administration created a document, “Playbook for Early Response to High-Consequence 
Emerging Infectious Disease Threats and Biological Incidents,” which the Trump administration 
claims does not exist (Knight and Kaiser Health News 2020). Japan has a similar politicization of 
disease management. Despite experience handling large natural disasters, Japan has been 
unprepared for Covid-19 or other possible disasters: “nuclear, biological, or chemical hazards” 
(Egawa 2020). This lack of preparation mostly occurs because of governmental reliance on 
panels of experts who inform politicians rather than its equivalent of the U.S. Center for Disease 
Control, National Institute of Infectious Disease (Egawa 2020). The result is decisions mainly 
based on politics (Egawa 2020).  However, this echoes scandals from the 1990s of the Japanese 
governments’ failed response to the 1996 Kobe Earthquake and 1996 notification of how 
hemophilia patients were given H.I.V.-tainted blood transfusions in the early 1980s (Gordon 
2003, 318-319). The convergence of necessary procedures amidst nationalist rhetoric suggests a 
distribution of the sensible of national borders where the interior of the nation-state is assumed to 
be safe, whereas the exterior is assumed dangerous (see Bosniak 2003). 
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 Brazilian president Jair Bolsnaro initially hesitated to let Brazilian nationals in Wuhan, 
China to return. He cited their potential threat to spreading Covid-19 in Brazil, a potential lack of 
budget for an evacuation, and legal hurdles to having them quarantine in Brazil (Reuters Staff 
2020). The plan was to keep evacuated Brazilians in military bases distant from Brazil’s urban 
areas (Phillips 2020). Evacuated Australians were evacuated and sent to quarantine in Christmas 
Island, a notorious holding prison-like holding place for asylum seekers (B.B.C. 2020a). Citizens 
in both countries were treated as threats, even when arriving in their home countries. 
 Americans were evacuated by plane from Wuhan, China, the initial epicenter of the 
Covid-19 virus. This evacuation received considerable news attention. Initial footage of 
disembarking passengers from Wuhan, China shows workers in full hazmat suits assisting them 
from plane to bus (Sun and Abutaleb 2020). The same article alleges that workers were not 
wearing proper protective gear on at least three occasions when assisting evacuees (Sun and 
Abutaleb 2020). This disjuncture between the photo and allegations portrays the distribution of 
the sensible of national space. Covid-19 is contagious in China, but not in The United States, as 
this picture would lead readers to believe. Put another way; The United States border is assumed 
to protect American citizens from Covid-19. The fact that the plane trip originated in Wuhan—
an area hard hit by Covid-19—and U.S. officials knew enough to understand that people on the 
plane could have Covid-19 and transmit it anywhere. However, the act of U.S. citizens crossing 
the U.S. border obscured medical realities. Another news report on the same subject alleges that 
workers left the quarantined military base and returned “freely,” moreover, a worker left 
California using commercial aviation (Cochrane, Weiland, and Sanger-Katz 2020). An online 
C.N.N. report on the same allegations contained a video juxtaposing evacuees disembarking 
from the plane at night—that could elicit fear—and hospital footage of people being treated for 
Covid-19, which later in the movie later seems to be likely from China by Chinese writing 
(Holmes, Watts and Kelly 2020). News commentators simultaneously critique the Trump 
administration and say that the public would rather hear science than politics (ibid).  This focus 
on Covid-19 as a Chinese threat would take on less subtle phrasing from the Trump 
administration. 
 Japan was slightly more careful with people coming into Japan on The Diamond 
Princess. Still, this caution followed a nationalist tone of not wanting to provide medical help for 
people who were not Japanese. Japanese people and foreign residents were kept on the ship, a 
place with a high likelihood of spreading the Covid-19 virus. The national and local governments 
were unwilling to test all the crew’s passengers due to inexperience and cost, and then-Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Yoshihisa Suga’s remarks of a general “toughness” (The Asashi Shimbun, 
February 21, 2020, paraphrased in Nakazawa, Ino, and Akabayashi. 2020). Overall, news reports 
may have promoted a sympathy with Japanese nationals and wealthy residents who could afford 
to travel on The Diamond Princess. Most of the crew members, forced to stay on after passengers 
left and provide essential worker services as the virus spread, were from “low and middle-
income countries in Southeast Asia” (Nakazawa, Ino, and Akabayashi. 2020). Such countries 
may include The Philippines and Thailand, two sending countries for immigrants discriminated 
against and stigmatized in Japan. Ten workers who tested positive for Covid-19 were not 
quarantined from other workers (Denyer, Dutta, and Kashiwagi 2020). 
However, the testing measures that international news media and studies criticize have 
become the norm for most Japanese citizens. Complaints about the handling of Covid-19 aboard 
The Diamond Princess include crew members not tested unless noticeably sick (even though 
Covid-19 often spreads with little or no symptoms) (Kakimoto, Yamagishi, Matsui, Suzuki, 
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Wakita 2020). This lack of testing has influenced Japanese experts and media outlets to speculate 
that Japan's Covid-19 infection rate may be significantly higher than national infection statistics 
(Wingfield-Hayes 2020; Ripley, Sidhu, Ogura, and Jozuka 2020). Japanese citizens there to help, 
doctors, and Self-Defense Forces soldiers, were allowed to enter and leave from the ship without 
quarantine. There were few taxis to take people to Tokyo, city buses had plastic dividers between 
drivers and passengers, and Japanese and international experts were skeptical that the virus 
would not spread from the ship to Japan (Rich and Yamamitsu 2020). This skepticism was 
despite the Japanese government saying that two weeks quarantine on the ship was sufficient 
(ibid). While this seems a courtesy to people who spent a traumatic time worrying that they 
might be catching Covid-19, it also shows a display of an idea that Covid-19 was a foreign threat 
that did not extend to Japanese people. The extension of Japan’s domestic Go-To travel 
campaign to international tourists will not occur until after Covid-19 is completely solved (Japan 
Tourism Campaign May 28, 2020). In sum, the Japanese government decided that Covid-19 
infection is dangerous in international, not domestic, settings. 
 Welcoming citizens back to their respective countries also set dangerous precedents and 
often enabled prejudicial bordering. In comparison with Japan and the United States, there was a 
bordering which assumed that national territory was immune to Covid-19 while people and lands 
outside of national borders were not. This bordering reinforces trends, old and new. But they also 
heighten nationalism too through aesthetic means. As an analysis of Rancière should state, the 
“distribution of the sensible” means making certain things sensible or possible (2004). Thus, 
prejudice against minorities becomes possible during Covid-19, after years of increased 
acceptance. In 2018, 64% of Australians, 59% of Japanese people, and 59% of Americans agreed 
that immigrants “make our country stronger” (Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey in Ana 
Gonzalez-Barrera And Phillip Connor 2019). With Covid-19 framed as an international threat to 
these countries, borders were closed. In Brazil, in March 2020, Jair Bolsnaro reacted to rising 
Covid-19 cases by promoted continued economic activity while shutting down Brazilian borders 
and not allowing non-Brazils to enter by air (Charner, Darlington, Hu, and Barnes 2020). In the 
United States, Aggressive prejudicial behavior against African Americans and Asian Americans 
rose during Covid-19 (Ruiz, Menasche, Horrowitz and Tamir 2020). But also, ideas of a 
fictitious homeland, safe from a dangerous elsewhere, were reinstated. In sum, the police order 
reinstated national borders and subsequent marginalized populations as a desirable category. 
Therefore, national bordering became desirable, if not to a majority, to enough people to harm 
racial and ethnic minorities. However, as will be explored in the next section, this bordering was 
not merely with foreign countries but became acceptable as an internal matter. 
 
The Honeycombing of Internal Borders to Unwelcome Citizens 
 
As international borders failed to protect residents of nation-states from Covid-19, at the time 
treated as an international, not domestic threat, governments offered a new solution: emphasizing 
subnational, municipal, and local borders. This internal bordering followed two main routes, both 
aesthetic. The first was map-making. In the second,mass media broadcasted police department 
actions. This seemingly new imposition of subnational, municipal, and local borders relied on a 
two-decade-old War on Terror strategy, the mobilization of police departments. This is a police 
order enforcement of new borders, not because police departments and police orders are the 
same things; they are not. Instead, these divisions functioned through the police order through 
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their attempts to reimpose an old category of subordination to police departments and other 
domestic displays of militarism. 
 Borders through the aesthetics of map-making did not arise from xenophobia. An early 
example of this aesthetic would be the John Hopkins University Covid-19 tracking map, created 
to provide medical information and inform people that there could be Covid-19 in their 
communities. In Japan, nightly national television news broadcasts currently display a map of the 
number of new Covid-19 infections by prefecture (sub-national unit). Much as some had 
assumed that The Peoples’ Republic of China was a dangerous Covid-19 hotspot, whereas Japan 
was not, residents of prefectures with low infection rates could assume they were safe by merely 
avoiding prefectures like Tokyo and Osaka that have high infection rates. This appeal to 
subnational borders is unusual for contemporary Japan. Japan’s premodern history was full of 
warring border states (Gordon 2003, 3). Japan’s modern history contains calls to national 
homogeneity (Gordon 2003, 254-256) and attempts to keep Japan linked through the tourism of 
an idealized countryside (Gordon 2003, 307-308).  A similar aesthetic exists within the United 
States. With more detailed information provided, that is concerning cities and counties, residents 
of rural areas could assume that Covid-19 was only a problem for urban areas. In light of the 
demographics, this takes on a racist tone. Rural areas are mostly white. In contrast, “U.S. urban 
cores, racial minorities (especially Black Americans), and those who cast votes for Hillary 
Clinton in 2016 disproportionately comprise counties where COVID-19 cases are currently 
clustered—a stark contrast to areas where there is a low level of coronavirus exposure.” (Frey 
2020). Therefore, while there is a supposedly neutral assumption about how to plan behavior in 
different places during Covid-19, there is a hidden racist logic.  
 In Japan, these distributions of the sensible of map-making helped inform Covid-19 
policy. High-risk areas received simultaneously positive and damaging policies. High-risk areas 
were allowed to declare emergencies and encourage telework and restaurants and bars to shut 
down. However, when the Japanese government tried to boost the ailing tourist economy with 
the “Go-To” campaign, which commenced on July 22, 2020, Tokyo excluded itself over fears 
from “government officials and medical experts” of it spreading Covid-19 from Tokyo to the rest 
of Japan (The Asahi Shimbun 2020a). 74% of Japanese voters surveyed oppose the Go-To 
campaign (The Asahi Shimbun 2020b), and health officials warned that it was happening too 
soon amidst Covid-19 infections (Takahashi 2020.). At the same time, Okinawa, a hitherto low-
risk area with a large indigenous population, was included. Though it is hard to tell if this 
resulted from holiday travel from places like Tokyo during Covid-19—at a U.S. military base, 
there was a no-mask party—the number of Covid-19 cases shortly after the Obon holiday period, 
August 13
th
, 2020. The Okinawan Prefecture declared a State of Emergency on August 13
th
, 
though it did not discourage out-of-prefecture visitors (The Asahi Shimbun 2020c). While many 
cases were untraceable, less than 2% of traced cases were outside visitors, and the United States 
government has not provided enough information on military members to trace how they may be 
impacting the prefecture’s infection rate (The Asahi Shimbun 2020c). One way or another, as an 
oppressed minority, Okinawans suffered the brunt of racism during the Covid-19 period. 
 In other countries, internal borders took on a more policed and militarized response. In 
Australia, temporally banned cross-prefectural travel in some prefectures (BBC. 2020b). 
Australia has a long history of quarantines to infectious diseases involving international and 
subnational borders (Moloney and Moloney 2020). As per a semiotics of bordering, the 
Australian government has a picture of the Coronavirus in blue—a color often not found in 
edible foods. To the left of this is a caption reading, “Each state or territory has their own entry 
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requirements” (Australian Interstate Quarantines n.d.). Therefore, the medical danger of Covid-
19 is highlighted simultaneously to a matter of fact statement that subnational units should be 
authorized to control Covid-19. Therefore, the proliferation of quarantine borders is naturalized 
as a response to a biological threat. An international representation of Australia's response to 
Covid-19 shows a different response. The BBC shows young people drinking in a restaurant 
without protective masks in Australia's “virus-free” Northern territory (BBC 2020a). The photo 
of multicultural, supposedly Covid-19-free youth, partially obscures the inequality of non-white 
refugees and immigrants banned as a Covid-19 threat by Australia. The article details how the 
Northern Territory of Australia has closed its borders with other parts of Australia to deter the 
spread of Covid-19. Thus, borders are blocked as a threat and to protect privileged subnational 
sectors. 
In Brazil, economically prosperous border towns have been allowed exceptions to strict 
national borders and negotiated Covid-19 mitigation policies with Paraguay in towns located on 
both sides of the Brazil-Paraguay border (Arnson, Gedan and Prusa August 7, 2020). Argentina 
has made areas within Argentina for Brazilian truck drivers to stop without contacting 
Argentinians (ibid; Associated Press 2020). However, indigenous people in border areas closer to 
Brazil’s northern border have been hit hard by Covid-19, and those countries have shut down 
border crossings (ibid). Thus, while Brazil has typically mismanaged Covid-19, there are internal 
borders that mark the difference between dysfunctional and effective policies. There is a 
different price on human life, which varies within countries rather than simply across countries, 
as Balmford et al. (2020) say. The Associated Press (2020) shows a picture of an open grave 
with text about how Brazil’s neighbors are worried about its “open borders” during Covid-19. 
The spread of Covid-19 is used in neutral mass media to justify the spread of borders. 
On the East Coast of the United States, two popular tourist destinations, North Carolina’s 
Outer Banks (Elassar 2020) and the Florida Keys, had police prohibit off-island visitors (Lazo 
and Shaver 2020; ). While Dare County, which includes the Outer Banks, banned all non-local 
residents, including out-of-state property owners, this ban assumed that people within the county 
were not Covid-19 risks (ibid). Also, policed roadblocks in Texas and Florida required promises 
of out-of-state travelers to quarantine (ibid), as well as considerations of doing so on the 
subnational border between Kentucky and Tennessee, and coastal communities popular with 
New York City residents (McDonnell Nieto del Rio and Ellis, 2020). These bans assume that 
only people from outside of jurisdiction were threats. Subnational and county borders were 
promoted as barriers that protect against Covid-19 premised upon an unscientific assumption that 
Covid-19 cannot spread within borders. Lazo and Shaver’s (2020) Washington Post article 
visually illustrated the semiotics of militarism and policing with police, aided by military Hum-V 
trucks stopping cars in Rhode Island and police checking peoples’ papers that verify Dare 
County North, Carolina residency. Since these are actual pictures of procedures, they go beyond 
simple media-bias as things that happened. The media repeat the distribution of the sensible 
provided by the military and police. 
While some of the subnational and county-level border checkpoints pertain to people 
regardless of class, race, or ethnicity, they also reveal problematic issues about more oppressed 
people. At face-value, these border checkpoints and police surveillance of people from other 
subnational entities are quite similar to how law enforcement has been positioned along borders 
to stop the immigrants. The door-to-door checkups in Rhode Island somewhat resemble The 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (I.C.E.) raids on undocumented immigrants. However, in 
The Florida Keys, The Outerbanks, and tourist towns in Rhode Island, the people targeted were 
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economically privileged. They did not have to be there. In some ways, the articles lament 
something that has been happening to people of color and immigrants but shows victimization of 
the U.S. population's economically privileged sectors. They are not the people who are getting 
Covid-19 because they have to work in a grocery store, drive a bus, or work as a nurse. The 
people targeted do not seem to come from over-crowded, working-class urban areas with a 
higher Covid-19 infection rate. People in such communities, mostly African-American and 
Latina/o, would benefit from being able to leave. Readers are left with, if not a white 
victimization narrative, an upper-class victimization narrative. In this way, readers’ sympathies 
may momentarily shift away from people of color and immigrants who are harder hit by Covid-
19. Therefore, rightwing populism has promoted a racist narrative within relatively liberal news 
sources. 
While rightwing populism has promoted a mass media forgetting of people of color's 
plight, it also does so while reporting on another group who it disfavors: the urban elite. While 
the urban elite—the upper middle class and wealthy people who can afford to leave cities for 
vacation houses—are better of during Covid-19 than others, they are also economic elite from 
predominantly pluralist cities, a political target of rightwing populism. As Mudde (2004, 561) 
puts it, “In the populist mind, the elite are the henchmen of ‘special interests’. Historically, these 
powerful, shady forces were bankers and international financiers (often alleged to be Jewish). 
But in contemporary populism a ‘new class’ has been identified, that of the ‘progressives’ and 
the ‘politically correct.’” Internal borders thus group this “elite” with the means to escape Covid-
19 hotspots are in the enemy category with immigrants and people of color who are not and 
contrasted with “the people” who are often rural whites. Thus, news reporting leads to a potential 
to divide these political groups, to promote jealousy and competition between them. To critique 
the newspaper articles for ignoring white privilege also strengthens a claim of rightwing 
populism about the corrupt elite. In the United States especially, this potentially splits the 
Democratic Parity’s main constituencies. Not reporting on it also strengthens a claim of 
rightwing populism: people should ignore race and ethnicity.  
 In both Australia and The United States, a police order distribution of the sensible of 
bordering was applied to citizens, not immigrants, to give an illusion that effective policy was 
underway to stop Covid-19. Just like in the case of borders, this was a mere display that made 
peoples’ lives uncomfortable rather than halted the spread of Covid-19. 
 If these borders are spreading internally, often at the request of local, not national leaders, 
it might be reasonably expected that this means an increase in localized power. However, the 
spread of these borders may replicate the former nation-state’s relationship to foreign countries, 
this time applied to smaller states and municipalities. Whereas The United States has coerced 
influence in Latin American countries south of the U.S.-Mexico border, it does so with areas 
demarcated as almost separate in subnational and municipal boundaries. For example, the Trump 
administration has frequently tried to get states to open up their economies early despite having 
higher Covid-19 rates. In other countries, a similar process has occurred. The national 
government declared a state of emergency that included Osaka and Nagoya. Aichi prefecture, 
located between the two cities, declared a state of emergency independent of the national 
emergency. While Aichi Prefecture's state of emergency was not legally binding for its 
businesses and residents, it enabled it to use private property, medical or food supplies if needed 
to fight a mass Covid-19 outbreak (Kyodo News 2020). In Brazil, Bolsnaro has forced 
municipalities to reopen despite high Covid-19 infection rates (Al-Jazeera 2020). Thus, a 
seeming devolution has elicited a harsher nation-state crackdown rather than an increase in 
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subnational power. But this comes through a media repetition of the distribution of the sensible 
of subnational and municipal leaders who are facing off with ineffective national leaders. This 
distribution of the sensible makes it seem as if some portion of these governments had an 
effective policy. However, by assuming the logic and distribution of the sensible of bordering, 
these subnational and municipal units have—intentionally or not—reproduced national 
bordering.  
 In sum, map-making has morphed from a way to share information about Covid-19 to a 
reality and a partition of possibility of internal bordering that makes these borders appear 
sensible, whereas, at other times, they would not. This internal bordering initially diminishes 
subnational and municipal power by reproducing a subordinate relationship that smaller nation-
states have with larger, more powerful nation-states. However, a police order distribution of the 
sensible of borders obscures this subordinate process. Subnational and municipal units either use 
words and images or police intimidation to dissuade cross-subnational-border travel, making 
them look like nation-states enforcing national borders. Yet, as national borders have hardly 
stopped global threats—climate change, vote manipulation, wars, etc.—these subnational 
borders do not stop threats from other areas of their respective nations. These subnational 
borders replicate national borders’ violence. The main difference is that nation-states direct 
violence to subnational and municipal units. An often misleading sense of government dealing 
with Covid-19 distracts from this violence. This distracting illusion is aesthetic because it offers 
one thing, to be consumed through viewing and accepting a sensibility—in Rancière’s (2004) 
terms—of borders. During this police distribution of the sensible, people forget that governments 
are doing little to help underlying problems. 
 To call this a distribution of the sensible of bordering misses one important temporal 
issue addressed better in genealogical terms. This internal bordering is occurring during a global 
situation of rightwing populism. In many cases, the urban areas excluded assume the role of the 
Other rightwing populism. The rural areas consist of “the people” who are usually white, 
whereas urban areas consist of the Other, the corrupt elite, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
immigrants. Therefore, to border off urban areas as dangerous to Covid-19, whereas rural areas 
are safe, mirrors the racialized aspect of rightwing populism in The United States, Europe, and 
Brazil. In Japan, the issue is slightly more complicated, given the low visibility of Identity 
politics. However, areas that are more relevant to the Japanese nation-state, such as Tokyo, are 
more protected, whereas peripheral areas, such as Okinawa, are not. In Okinawa, issues of 
identity are present given the Okinawan peoples’ differing ethnic identities. However, Covid-19 




The main argument has been that there is an emerging aesthetic practice of bordering that enacts 
real borders within nation-states. This emerging aesthetic emerged through three seemingly 
different, albeit linked processes: 1) scapegoating of foreign countries (Toohey 2021), which 
existed before Covid-19, 2) welcoming home citizens from Covid-19 hotspots without proper 
precautions, which elicited a nationalist idea of borders and territory, and 3) the honeycombing 
of borders to deal with certain unwelcome citizens. All three processes contain various forms of 
inequality—that is, criticizing the Peoples’ Republic of China also harmed Asian-Americans. 
Similarly, the idea of welcoming back citizens assumes that non-citizens are not welcome during 
crises. The third category, the honeycombing of borders, appears to merely unwelcome 
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somewhat wealthy people. However, it elicits a militarized policing and reinforces rightwing 
populist ideas of the urban elite as dangerous to rural people (see Mudde 2004). Ultimately, this 
third category is a boomerang effect of xenophobia and inequality inherent in rightwing 
populism. Rightwing populists may think that strong leaders have taken action to control urban 
elites. However, these anti-elite actions obscure how rightwing populists have failed to protect 
them from the Covid-19 pandemic. Covid-19 is now spreading in rural areas where many 
rightwing populists live. This failure is especially apparent in states like Texas and Florida.  
 The internal borders, what I refer to as a honeycombing of borders, and its resultant 
failure to stop Covid-19 might seem to be a weakening of national power. However, this 
honeycombing of borders seems more to assert national power over subnational units. This re-
assertion of sovereignty differs in the countries studied. Subnational entities and municipalities 
in the United States and Brazil that resisted national Covid-19 policies were treated like 
unfavored foreign countries beyond territorial borders. In Japan, subnational entities with high 
Covid-19 rates are excluded from Japan’s image as a country that has succeeded in containing 
Covid-19 without harming its economy. In Australia, a similar thing occurs with some 
subnational entities. An intensely violent version of these above processes occurred in the 
Brazilian Amazon with indigenous people and The Peoples’ Republic of China with the Tibetans 
and Uyghurs who bear the brunt of Covid-19 and national policies to destroy their cultural and 
physical existence. The amount of suffering and oppression in these examples varies 
considerably between these situations; however, they conceptually relate in a discursive way 
through a “regularity” of “heterogeneous” practices (Foucault 1989a). 
 Though not phrased as national, subnational, or municipal borders, precedents exist for 
this type of bordering. Bordering of property into quantifiable land helped expand the U.S. 
frontier across land occupied by Native Americans and Mexicans (Grandin 2019). Yet, what is 
surprising is that this type of border expansion began with land often not considered to belong to 
the United States or different forms of land use protected by treaties. Moreover, the 
honeycombing of borders during Covid-19 troubles an idea of “bordering” as symbolic or subtle 
by following a logic usually observed for the external operations of borders directed against 
foreign countries and non-citizens, especially immigrants. This process, therefore, poses some 
thorny problems for studies of inequality. 
On the one hand, a new group is subject to subnational and municipal borders in the 
United States. On the other, this group is often economically privileged and differs from people 
whose status as people of color, indigenous, low income, female, or too young suffers more 
deaths or job-loss from Covid-19. This is part of a complicated process of rightwing populism, 
which takes attention away from people who have suffered some form of internal bordering. 
African-American and Latina/o neighborhoods in New York City suffered from physical borders 
by another name—Parkways that cut through urban areas—cordoning them off into 
economically depressed areas (Caro 1975) full of police violence. The generalization of this 
process to other people living in urban areas, who rightwing populism lumps into an undesirable 
category along with people of color—needs to consider these long histories of oppression. Mass 
media analyzed in this article does not, but instead presents internal borders as isolated incidents 
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1. A premodern example of pandemics influencing long term affects on other marginalized groups is how, 
as European hospitals for leprosy brought back from The Crusades eventually became the inane asylums 
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Informed by the disciplines of Leadership Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies, the authors 
offer an ecosystemic understanding of the relationship between peace, protests, and sustainable 
reconciliation. While the recent Covid-19 pandemic has prompted multiple reassurances that ‘we 
are all in this together,’ this paper focuses on conditions that must be present and conditions that 
opposes the quest for reconciliation from that reassuring perspective. Polarization of dualistic 
thinking (who is right/wrong), attitudes of superiority, and being driven by ‘negative visions,’ the 
authors argue, deny efforts for sustainable reconciliation. Aimed at building trust, sustainable 
reconciliation depends on the willingness of all parties to construct four critical conditions: 
soulful engagement at intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural levels, increasing choices, 
purposeful dwelling, and deutero-learning. 
 
 
It is proper to every gathering that gatherers 
assemble to coordinate their efforts to sheltering; 
only when they have gathered with that end in view 
do they begin to gather. (Heidegger, 1977, n.p.). 
 
Informed by the disciplines of Leadership Studies and Peace and Conflict Studies, the authors 
offer an ecosystemic understanding of the relationship between peace, protests, and sustainable 
reconciliation. While the recent Covid-19 pandemic has prompted multiple reassurances that ‘we 
are all in this together,’ this paper focuses on conditions that must be present and conditions that 
opposes the quest for reconciliation from that reassuring perspective. Polarization of dualistic 
thinking (who is right/wrong), attitudes of superiority, and being driven by ‘negative visions,’ the 
authors argue, deny efforts for sustainable reconciliation. Aimed at building trust, sustainable 
reconciliation depends on the willingness of all parties to construct four critical conditions: 
soulful engagement at intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural levels, increasing choices, 
purposeful dwelling, and deutero-learning. Informed by the disciplines of Leadership Studies and 
Peace and Conflict Studies, the purpose of this article is to offer an ecosystemic understanding of 
the relationship between peace, protests, and sustainable reconciliation. It attempts to offer both a 
theoretical and practical application of facilitating reconciliation. As I began writing this article, 
we were hit by the spread of COVID-19 which continues to consume our consciousness in the 
media, in societies around the world, and in our homes. This wicked disease is indifferent to 
whom it attacks and kills, and it recognizes no boundaries or treaties. With the presence of 
COVID-19, we kept hearing the phrase: “ we are all in this together.”  
The particular context that triggered our desire to write this article is the recent protests 
by some Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs and their supporters in Canada. Just before the global 
spread of Covid-19 consumed our lives, we in Canada, were trying to make sense of the 
Wet’suwet’en protests and arrests by the Royal Canadian Mounted police in northern British 
Columbia (B.C). These arrests triggered railway blockades and other protests across the country 
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that led to the shutdown of rail services in the busiest corridor of Eastern Canada and higher 
levels of uncertainty, stress, and layoffs in the community.  
While in the thick of these protests, the Government of Canada, under the prime minister-
ship of Justin Trudeau, called for patience, dialogue, and mutual respect. On the other side of the 
political aisle, the current interim representative of the opposition Conservative party, Andrew 
Scheer, criticized the government for not enforcing the law, accused the protestors for holding 
the economy hostage, called on those who demonstrated their solidarity with Wet’suwet’en 
Nations to “check their privilege,” and publicly stated in the House of Commons that “dialogue 
will not put food on the table.”  In the privacy of my own home, I was challenged by my 
daughter. “Dad, you teach and write about leadership. What will you do? I guess we are not all in 
this together, are we?” These questions posed to ‘Dad,’ spurred me to address the following 
research questions: 
 
 For the sake of reconciliation and healing, what conditions must be present for all to act 
from the perspective that ‘we are all in this together?’  
 What conditions prevent us from seeing and acting from this perspective? 
 What learning process can we construct to make it possible for self and others to act from 
the perspective of ‘we are all in this together?’ 
 
In this article I will address the first two questions. The second article that will follow in the next 
issue of The International Journal of Peace Studies, will address the third question. In that 
upcoming article, I will address the theory and praxis of reconciliation at three interconnected 
levels, intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural levels. There I will offer a deutero-learning 
model for the sake of introducing a process of thinking and acting in ways that ‘we are (indeed) 
all in this together.’  
I will proceed first by expanding the context with a particular focus on the Wet’suwet’en 
protests and protests in general. Second, in relation to being ‘brought to peace,’ I will reconsider 
Heidegger’s notion of what it means to dwell in this place called Canada within the context of 
Canada’s history with its Indigenous population. Third, I will reflect on the notion of 
reconciliation. Fourth, I will proceed to outlining what it means to address reconciliation from an 
ecosystems thinking perspective.  Finally, I will attend to the consequences of choosing not to 
engage in the art and practice of reconciliation.  
 
Context: Wet’suwet’en Protests 
 
In February of 2020, Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs staged protests in opposition to Coastal 
GasLink’s plans to build a pipeline through their land. While the non-elected hereditary chiefs 
are a form of Indigenous governance that precedes British colonization, they are not a part of the 
structure of elected Indigenous Band Councils which was introduced by the Canadian federal 
government through the Indian Act.  Some claim that The Indian Act is a form of imposed 
leadership structure that resembled Canada’s system of governance (Lamoureux, 2018). The 
authority of the hereditary chiefs precede the Indian Act, and they continue to oversee the 
management of traditional lands. While the Indigenous Band Councils function as administrators 
of all federal funding provided by the Indian Act to First Nations, the “hereditary chiefs’ 
authority is with respect to all of their ancestral lands and those are the lands that they're seeking 
to protect” (Stanton, as cited in Cousins, 2020).  
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The $6.6 billion, 670-kilometer pipeline would carry natural gas across Norther British 
Columbia, Canada. According to the Coastal GasLink’s website, this approved route “was 
determined considering Indigenous, landowner and stakeholder input, the environment, 
archaeological and cultural values, land use compatibility, safety, constructability and 
economics.” The company noted that it signed agreements with the elected council of all 20 First 
Nations along the route. And, as National Chief Perry Bellegarde of the Assembly of First 
Nations, noted, the band councils did “their due diligence and they want to be part of this 
economic initiative, create jobs for their people, be part of the economy, and they balanced the 
environment and the economy” (as cited in Cousins, 2020).  
On the other side of the coin, we hear from hereditary chiefs that they object to the 
pipeline because it could contaminate the land that is part of who they are, and upon which they 
depend on to harvest food, medicines, and draw water. While business executives warned that 
the rail blockades in Ontario, Quebec, and B.C were stalling the nation’s economy, the protestors 
say that the real issue are Indigenous rights, the use and/or misuse of their land, and their 
livelihoods. Ansloos, a member of the Fisher River Cree Nation, and a University of Toronto 
professor, complained that the protests and arrests  
 
...show an absolute disregard for the rights of (Indigenous Peoples), a complete 
abandonment of the so-called spirit of reconciliation, and a real instrumentalizing of 
federal colonial structure in the Indian Act to provide the appearance of consultation 
that’s sufficient to meet UN standards. (as cited in Cousins, 2020) 
 
Human protests are not a rarity in human history. In 1517, for example, Martin Luther, an 
Augustinian monk, protested against the Catholic Church and some of its teachings and 
practices. His protest led to the age of the protestant reformation. Mohandas Gandhi’s peaceful 
march to the sea in 1930, and other acts of civil disobedience and principled non-violence, led to 
India regaining its independence from 250 years of British colonial rulership. While his 
supporters viewed him as Mahatma, meaning ‘the great soul,’ the Prime Minister of England at 
that time, Sir Winston Churchill, labeled him as a “seditious Middle Temple lawyer,” who had 
the gall “to parley in equal terms with the representatives of the King Emperor” (as cited in 
Mukerjee, 2010, p. 25).  In saying  ‘NO’ to giving up her seat on the bus in 1955, Rosa Parks 
triggered a Montgomery bus boycott as a protest against a racialized system that entrenched 
‘force’ in the hands of white citizens that robbed Afro-American citizens of their human dignity 
and their right to vote. Her protest led to the birth of the Civil Rights Movement. Today, we see 
other forms of protests as they are reflected in “#me too movement,” #black lives matter 
movement,” Women’s Rights Movement, calls for Gender Equality and an end to violence 
against women, and the Equal Rights Movement.  
 
Moving Away from Leader-Centric Models 
While some may be tempted to ask valid questions like (a) how does a leader deal with polarized 
factions?, or (b) what values are implicit in a leader’s protests?, or (c) how do leaders go about 
the process of inciting protests?, we choose to do otherwise. Notice, for example, that each of 
these three questions focuses on the person of the leader. It has led many to focus on a leader-
centric approach to the study of leadership (Hunter, Bedell-Avers, & Mumford, 2007) and it has 
also led to calls to go beyond this predominant focus (Beau, 2016; 2009 Grint, 2005; 2011; Rost, 
1991; Thoroughgood et al., 2018). Part of the problem with leader-centric models is that it is 
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easy to blame the ‘person in charge’ (Heifetz, 1994). If they are elected officials, it is convenient 
to blame them for the failures to address any problem to electors’ satisfaction. Afterall, one 
might argue, is that not why they elected them in the first place? Blaming absolves one of taking 
responsibility for their own actions in any of those ‘failures.’ In our own reference to persons 
like Martin Luther, Gandhi, and Rosa Parks, we too can be accused of focusing on the ‘person.’ 
While we cannot deny the human agency of individual actors, there is something more. 
Their individual actions, for example, triggered the birth of “mass movements.” We might ask: 
“did Rosa Parks intend to initiate a mass protest like the Montgomery Bus Boycott, or the Civil 
Rights Movement?”  Short answer: we do not know. All we do know is that she was tired of 
being pushed around. She was tired of being treated like a second-class citizen. When asked by 
students who interviewed her: “How do you feel about being called the ‘Mother of the Civil 
Rights Movement?’ Parks responded, “I don’t know who started calling me that, but I accept the 
title quite well” (Parks, 1979, Para. 19). The Civil Rights Movement was a result of others who 
joined-in with Park’s (protestors’) desire to be treated with dignity and as equals (common 
purpose). Others joined-in in a manner that affirmed that her (protestors’) voice also mattered to 
them.  
When we speak of a “movement,” we cannot but shift our focus to the actions of a mixed 
collective: there will be some who join the initiated action of a person and some who will resist 
those actions. To think of leadership within the context of a mixed collective (where needs and 
goals may be common to some and contradictory to others) is to understand leadership as that 
which emerges through the social construction of relationships among initiator of actions and 
others who join or resist the initiator in bearing the responsibility of realizing the purpose of an 
initiated action. All initiated actions, however, do not occur in abstraction. They occur within the 
confines of a particular historical, societal, organizational, or individual context.  
Contained within the paragraph above are four different and yet interrelated 
understanding of what it means “to act.” Allow us to turn to Arendt (1958), a political theorist, 
who outlined how the Greek and Latin vocabulary offer a fourfold distinction of the verb “to 
act.”  
 
Table 1: Greek and Latin Understanding of the verb “to act” 
 Greek Latin 
Archein: “to begin”; “to lead” “to rule” Agere: “to set in motion”; “to lead”  
Prattein: “to pass through”; “to achieve”; “to 
finish”; 
Gerere: “to bear”; 
 
Whereas the Latin agere refers to leading as setting something new in motion (initiative), 
prattein and gerere speak instead to the possibility of others (followers) joining in to “bear” and 
“finish” the work by seeing it through (achievement). Today, prattein/gerere (achievement, 
accomplishing goals, shared or otherwise, and finishing the task), have become the accepted 
understanding of action in conventional definitions of leadership. The leader is seen, especially 
in industrial paradigms of leadership, as achieving or producing excellence (Rost, 1991, p. 118). 
Rost argues that this concept effective leadership, namely, intending (promising) change and 
producing intended changes continues to be taught in management schools. Success, in this case 
is the actual production of intended or promised results. From the standpoint of agere, the 
strength of leadership, however, is displayed in their “initiative” and “the risk” they take, “not in 
the actual achievement” (Arendt, 1958, p. 190). The frustration that is experienced with action as 
initiative (agere) are twofold, (a) its outcomes are unpredictable, and (b) the intended and 
Facilitating Reconciliation  43 
unintended consequences of initiated actions are irreversible. This “exasperation” and 
“frustration” of action are “almost as old as recorded history” (Arendt, 1958, p. 220). In as much 
as initiatives for social justice began years ago, today, we continue to experience the unfinished 
outcomes of promised results. The Wet’suwet’en protests and #BlackLives Matter movement are 
but examples of our “unfinished business.” 
 
A Bigger Story 
Within the context of the Wet’suwet’en protests, Canadians find themselves in the middle of a 
bigger story. It is a story that is itself informed by two differing narratives of Canada’s collective 
memories. As Ladner, noted “for Indigenous peoples, the story of Canada is one of myth, magic, 
deceit, occupation, and genocide. For Canadians, the story is one of discovery, lawful 
acquisition, and the establishment of peace, order, and good governance” (2009, p. 279). If 
anything, these differing historical narratives of the colonized and colonizers (collective 
memories) encapsulates the gap between many Aboriginal and settler peoples. If the latter story 
is accepted without question, then how can we account for continuing Indigenous protests that 
continue to erupt in Canada? If the former story is not to be denied, then Canadians find 
themselves in the middle of a story of what the authors of the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (CTRC) report called “cultural genocide” (2015, p. 1). It included  
 
 The destruction of structures and practices the prevent that Indigenous people to continue 
as a group.  
 The seizing of lands, forcibly transferring Indigenous populations, and restricting 
movement. 
 The banning of the Indigenous language, the persecution of spiritual leaders, and 
forbidding Indigenous spiritual practices 
 The disruption of the transmission of Indigenous cultural values and identity from one 
generation to the next. 
 
This is not a fictious story. It is a historical fact. In this sense, the very idea of reconciliation calls 
Canadians to come to terms (re-concile) with its own history. To the CRTC, “‘reconciliation’ is 
about establishing and maintaining a mutually respectful relationship between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal peoples in this country” (Volume 6, p. 4). The authors of CTRC also affirm that 
the problem of reconciliation is “not an Aboriginal problem; it is a Canadian one” (p. v). In so 
affirming, they suggest that reconciliation is not in the hands of any one person in any elected 
position of authority, it is not in the hands on any one government of the day, and neither is it 
only in the hands of the Aboriginal population. It is in effect in the hands of ALL Canadians 
(reconciliation belongs to all), and to NO ONE Indigenous or non-Indigenous person in 
particular. What they seem to be saying is that the problem of reconciliation calls all Canadians 
to begin with the epistemology that “we are all in our brokenness together.”  
What then does it mean for Canadians to gather around their brokenness as they share a 
common dwelling place and history? Listen, for example, to the philosopher Heidegger who 
graced the opening page of our article: “It is proper to every gathering that gatherers assemble to 
coordinate their efforts to sheltering; only when they have gathered with that end in view do they 
begin to gather” (1977, n.p.). If reconciliation is a Canadian problem, then, all who gather with a 
view to reconciling are being called to gather with a purposeful intention, namely, to engage in 
conversations in ways that focus on the question of how they choose to commonly dwell 
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(shelter) in this common dwelling place called Canada without killing each other, or without 
simply being in opposition with each other, or simply tolerating the existence of the other. 
Understood in this way, tolerance is about “us” and “them.” It is about “us” tolerating “them.” 
Understood in this way, it continues to perpetuate polarization rather than unity. It denies the 
reality that there is only “us” in our dwelling place. It is here that we turn our attention to what 
Heidegger (1977) can teach us about what it means to dwell.   
 
Heidegger: On Building and Dwelling 
 
Heidegger informs us that we cannot talk about dwelling without talking about what we have 
built – with a twist. For him, building is really dwelling. “We do not dwell,” as he noted, 
“because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are 
dwellers” [Italics in original] (1977, p. 326). Heidegger turns to what the language of ‘dwelling’ 
offers. 
 
The old Saxon wuon, the Gothic wunian...means to remain, to stay in a place. But the 
Gothic wunian says more distinctly how this remaining is experienced. Wunian means to 
be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, Friede, 
means the free, das Frye; and fry means preserved from harm and danger, preserved from 
something, safeguarded. To free actually means to spare...To dwell, to be set at peace, 
means to remain at peace within the free...(Heidegger, 1997, p. 326) 
 
To remain and to stay in Canada as a collective, is a question of how this remaining and staying 
can be experienced. Following Heidegger, it can be experienced as “being at peace” or as “being 
brought to peace.” To stay in this place, requires gatherers to purposefully coordinate their 
efforts to their sheltering in ways that preserves, spares, and safeguards each other from harm 
and danger. In gathering with this end in view, gatherers make an intentional, purposive, and 
enlightened choice (Amaladas, 2018). For Heidegger, one enlightened choice is that all in the 
gathering take responsibility for safeguarding each other by subordinating or surrendering 
themselves to being governed by the principles of sparing, preserving, and safeguarding each 
other from harm or danger. Why? Because this is what friends do. Friends care by considering 
how each act or proposal would affect, and indeed, cannot not affect every other group or person. 
This is, in effect, the proposition of ecosystems thinking. It is the violation of these principles 




According to a United Nations report in 2004, the human history of reconciliation emerges out of 
attempts to deal with the legacy of violence and large-scale past abuses. Some, in the field of 
Peace Studies, have associated reconciliation with efforts at social rehabilitation and suggests 
that both are considered as one of the major components of reconstructing postconflict societies 
(Jeong, 2019). Others like Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) and Bar-Simon-Tav (2004), maintain that 
only reconciliation can build stable and lasting peace. At the same time, it is becoming 
increasingly evident that formal peace agreements fall short of establishing genuine peaceful 
relations between former adversaries (Lederach, 1997; Knox & Quirk, 2000). Other studies are 
also demonstrating that conflicts that are settled through negotiated settlements are not 
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sustainable. Zambakari (2018), for example, appealed to the results of negotiated settlements by 
The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. This Centre notes that 43 percent of contemporary 
conflicts relapse into renewed violence within five years. In their research, Jarstad and Sundberg 
(2007) mentioned that one third of 69 peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2000 failed, 
resulting in resumption of civil wars.  
Galtung (1998) underscores the importance of reconciliation through his affirmation of 
how individual and collective trauma left behind by large scale violence is passed from one 
generation to the next, perpetuating cycles of violence. Galtung argues that violent conflict over 
what he calls the “root” conflict, can generate a “meta conflict,” namely a “conflict that comes 
out of, or after, the root conflict, the over layer” (1998, p. 3). For Lumsden, this meta-conflict 
can become an “unconscious organizing principle,” (1999, p. 3), in that it can determine how 
people see the world a generation later and how they choose to act. This unconscious organizing 
principle can perpetrate killing the other or legitimizing other violent forms of dealing with 
conflict.  
Kriesberg defines reconciliation as a “process of developing a mutual conciliatory 
accommodation between antagonistic and formerly antagonistic persons or group” (1998, p. 
184). He identifies four dimensions of reconciliation as societies emerge from conflict: shared 
truth, justice, regard, and security. Lederach (1997) offers a systems thinking approach to 
reconciliation by attending to the dynamics of relationships in what he calls the conflict system. 
For him, the practice of reconciliation “must be proactive in seeking to create an encounter 
where people can focus on their relationships and share their perceptions, feelings, experiences 
with one another, with the goal of generating new perceptions and a new shared experience” 
(Lederach, 1997, p. 30). Both Kriesberg and Lederach share aspects of Kelman’s  view that 
conflict is an “interactive” and intersocietal” process driven by both “collective needs and fears” 
and by rational calculation of power and interests (1997). For Fisher, on the other hand, the 
dynamics of conflict escalation results from subjective experiences like “misperceptions, 
mistrust, and frustrated basic needs” (1999, p. 85). Similarly, Lederach (1997; 2005) also 
understands conflict as being an intra rather than inter-state and occur between factionalized 
identity groups who live in close proximity to each other.  
Scholars from both Peace Studies (Burton, 2001) and Leadership Studies (Burns, 1978; 
2003) affirm that the full meaning of social justice and reconciliation depends on a non-
negotiable social principle of treating “persons like persons” (Burns, 1978, p. 462, Italics in 
original) and not as pawns to be manipulated, enslaved, or controlled. It is to regard human 
dignity and human rights as a sacred gift that humans give to each other. At a political level, 
however, what stands in the way is what Giddens (1984) identifies as the presence of ‘power 
asymmetry.’ Power asymmetry is a stru state in which differences in status exist between 
individuals and groups of individuals within a social or organizational hierarchy resulting in 
differential ability to take action or cause action to be taken. It is also a state that surfaces the 
unbalance of resources and authority among the actors which operate in the same network.  
Within this condition of ‘power asymmetry,’ Burton, argues that power-asymmetry, “subjects” 
individuals “to the effects of ‘structural violence,’ that is that they are hurt by the institutions and 
norms of society including such inequalities and discrimination” (2001, n.p.). Frustration 
behaviours like protests, drug use, suicide, gang violence are outcomes of power-asymmetries.  
What then is this literature on reconciliation telling us? First, while reconciliation, as a 
possibility, emerges out of conflict, it promises the possibility of sustainability in ways that 
negotiated peace settlements cannot. Second, that reconciliation needs to occur at three levels: 
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intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural.  Jeong (2009) and Kiss (2000), for example, remind 
their readers that reconciliation cannot be reconstructed through judicial instruments alone. As 
Jeong notes, “political, cultural, psychological, and spiritual means are demanded as well” (2009, 
p. 156).   Third, that reconciliation is a process towards a shared appreciation and understanding 
that we can live in our common dwelling place in ways that spares and preserves each other from 
harm and danger. Finally, that we will have more of the same (violence) should we choose to 
preserve power asymmetrical relationships and choose to not to go down this less traveled road 
called reconciliation. 
 
On Negative/Positive Visions 
 
It is quite telling that today, while we are in the middle of a global pandemic called Covid-19, we 
also hear this same mantra from nearly every senior official and from leading media outlets 
across Canada and the world: “we are all in this together.” On the one hand this mantra is a 
social affirmation that we, as individuals and as a collective, are interconnected. Not only are we 
interconnected with each other, but we are also interconnected with our land, our natural 
environment, and our food (what we choose to eat or not eat). In the midst of Covid-19, we 
become very aware that we are interconnected in the sense that what I do or not do in your 
presence (for example, wearing a mask) will affect you and vice versa. On the other hand, it is 
also a cautionary note that if we do not do what is necessary to act together to contain, not spread 
the virus, and find a cure for this disease, then we will all lose. Within the context of Covid-19, 
that “we are all in this together” is a non-negotiable concept. However, unlike calls to “wash 
your hands,” during this Covid-19 times, punctuating ourselves as separate from what is 
affecting us does not free us to wash our hands of our collective responsibility and concern about 
outcomes. 
In the middle of Covid-19, it appears as if the call to act from the perspective that “we are 
all in this together,” to pull together in ways that are united and not divided, is heard more clearly 
because our survival is threatened. `We are all in this together,` then appears to gain momentum 
from the perspective of what we don`t want to experience: death, losing jobs, restricted 
movement, quarantine, social distancing, self isolation, and so forth. For Senge (2006), an 
organizational learning theorist, these are examples of a `negative vision` (what we don`t want) 
and he observes that this is, “more  common in public leadership, where societies are continually 
bombarded with visions of ‘anti-drug,’ ‘antismoking,’ ‘antiwar’ or ‘anti-nuclear strategy’” (p. 
209). If this is so, then when a cure is found for Covid-19, when the threat of survival is no-
more, the call to act as if we are all in this together and the energy that is spent on acting in 
solidarity, will also naturally disappear.  
Within the context of our complex Canadian history, reconciliation does not appear to 
have that same negative vision or force as Covid-19. It is not motivated by the question of “what 
do we want to avoid?” but rather by the question of “what do we want?” Reconciliation is not 
motivated by the fear of avoiding what we do not want (we don’t want to be killed by a virus, we 
don’t want protests). It is instead governed by the aspiration of what we do want (to live together 
in ways that spare and preserve each other from harm and danger). To reject this would in effect 
mean rejecting the notion that we are all in this together.  
The very presence of protests can be viewed as practices that are themselves governed by 
aspirations for social justice, for being treated with dignity and respect, for freedom, for power 
symmetry, and for treating persons as persons and not as pawns to be controlled and 
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manipulated. These are not dependent upon the presence or absence of any particular virus. 
Reconciliation, as a Canadian aspiration, will remain with us even after the cure for Covid-19 is 
found. Paradoxically, the aspiration for what we do want necessitates that as a collective, we 
intentionally turn toward rather than away from practices that we want to see avoided in our 




We cannot deny that one conceptual framework that speaks to the interconnectedness of our 
relationships with each other, is embedded in the frame of ecosystemic thinking.  Ecosystemic 
thinking challenges us to pay attention to three critical principles: (a) unveiling how we know 
what we know, (b) focusing on relationships of interdependence and its breakdowns, and (c) 
context. In relation to knowing what it means to lead for peace, we learn that whereas the 
concept of peace has been understood as freedom from war, violence, or dissension (negative 
peace), it has also been understood as a journey towards a state of harmony between people or 
groups, or the aspiration for social justice (positive peace) (Galtung, 1964). At a conceptual level 
ecosystemic thinking suggests that we can only come to know humanly constructed concepts like 
peace only in relation to the concept of war, violence, dissension, conflict. Following cultural 
anthropologists Mead (1968) and Bateson and Bateson, (1987), in their thinking of second-order 
cybernetics or the cybernetics of cybernetics, Flemons (1991) and Becvar and Becvar (2018) 
argue that, we come to know what we know with the drawing of a distinction, or with the noting 
of a difference. The distinctions we make, reflect the values in our purpose for making any 
distinction.  
From the perspective of relationships of interdependence, while these humanly 
constructed concepts and distinctions (peace/war; positive/negative), describe two different kinds 
of social relationships, they are complementary, and this “complementarity between peace and 
war...describes one concept rather than two” (Becvar & Becvar, 2018, p. 15). They are concepts 
and ways of living that imply an interdependent relationship. In as much as Kriesberg defines 
reconciliation as a “process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between 
antagonistic and formerly antagonistic persons or group” (1998, p. 184), and Jeong (2009) as a 
process of mutual accommodation comprised of acknowledgment of past wrongdoing and 
contrition,14from the perpetrators in exchange for forgiveness offered by the victims” (2009, p. 
156), this need to reconcile, implies a breakdown or a brokenness of interdependencies that 
emerges out of a particular context, namely an experience of the imposition of one independence 
upon the other (Galtung, 2001).  
 
Ecosystemic Thinking and the Possibility of Increasing Choices 
 
Allow us to frame our story of interconnectedness by telling a story. It is a story narrated by a 
systems thinker, von Foerster (1990), in his Opening Address for the International Conference, 
Systems and Family Therapy: Ethics, Epistemology, New Methods.  
 
I have a dear friend who grew up in Marrakech. The house of his family stood on the 
street that divide the Jewish and the Arabic quarter. As a boy he played with all the 
others, listened to what they thought and said, and learned of their fundamentally 
different views. When I asked him once, "Who was right?" he said, "They are both right." 
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"But this cannot be," I argued from an Aristotelian platform, "Only one of them can have 
the truth!" 
 
"The problem is not truth," he answered, "The problem is trust."  
 
This boy who lived on a street that divides, who remained connected to both Jews and Arabs by 
playing with them, listening to what each thought and had to say, and learning their 
fundamentally different views, affirmed that the real problem is not one of who is right and who 
is wrong, but rather that it resided in the capacity to think and act in ways that offers a third, or 
fourth or fifth choices. The quest for knowing “who is right?” and “who is wrong?” closes-off 
choices. It orients more to the disconnectedness among people rather that how they are 
connected. It socially divides those who live on a street that physically divides. The singular 
quest for the truth, as the boy who straddled between and remained connected to both the Arabic 
and Jewish quarters affirms, closes-off the quest for understanding that what is really at stake is 
trust. To accept this is to accept that both sides have a truth that not only needs to be heard and 
respected, but also that both sides need to feel heard and respected. Without the experience of 
feeling heard, trust will not be a possibility. 
To act as if ‘we are all in this together’ then, is to act in ways that not only generates 
conditions of trust but also to act in ways that are worthy of trust. Earlier, we noted that 
reconciliation emerges out of the ashes of brokenness. Now we are able to affirm that what is 
broken is trust. Within the context of the Wet’suwet’en protests then, it cannot simply be a 
matter of asking if “the protestors were right,” or if “the protestors were wrong” in protesting. At 
the same time, it cannot also simply be a matter of asking if “the government of Canada was 
right in their response to protestors,” or if “the Government of Canada was wrong in their 
response to protestors.” The real issue is not who is right or wrong but the brokenness of trust. 
The re-building of trust, however, insofar as it aids us in the process of reconciliation, rests in the 
hands of all Canadians – it is not only everybody’s business, but it also requires a structural re-




To frame the problem of interconnectedness as the problem of increasing choices, is to challenge 
a predominant and deeply ingrained either-or mental model.  For Senge (2006), mental models 
“are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence 
how we understand the world and how we take action” (p. 8). Determining who is right or who is 
wrong, would be a naturally forced consequence of this either-or way of thinking. It is to think 
and act as if there are no, and can be no, other choices other than “only one of them can have the 
truth.”  
Either-or way of thinking and living would only lead us down the path of “us” (non-
protestors/protestors) and “them” (protestors/non-protestors). Within this either-or framework, 
the very idea of “we are all in this together” cannot be a possibility. Either-or thinking forces us 
to take sides (as if there are no other options). For Lederach, a practitioner who “spent most of 
(his) professional life working with deep-rooted conflicts and violence” (2005, p. 66), in this 
either-or model, “side-taking, unfortunately seems to accompany social battle-fields and 
therefore accepts the premise that change is inherently a dualistic struggle” (2005, p. 87).  
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Within the context of ‘protests,’ in the same way that peace and protest (conflict) are 
concepts that belong together in the sense that we cannot talk of one without the other, this 
dualistic way of thinking treats the “us” and the “them” in isolation from (disconnected), rather 
than as connected to, each other. Paradoxically, in order to stop the spread of Covid-19, the very 
idea and practice of social distancing and self-isolation that is being encouraged (because we are 
all in this together), leads to a polarization within the context of protests (which affirms that we 
are not all in this together). Whereas there is a distinct clarity in what social distancing and self-
isolation seeks to achieve while in the middle of a serious virus infection, there is also a distinct 
clarity in what the practice of isolating ‘who is right’ and ‘who is wrong’ achieves. This 
“individual in self-isolation model,” as Minuchin noted, can be viewed as “imposing an either/or 
dichotomy that doesn’t encompass the complexity of human processes. In the attempt to achieve 
clarity, it polarizes” (1984, p. 148). So, could it be that as human behaviour can at times be self-
defeating and in need of psychotherapy, this very epistemology of either/or, and the question of 
who is right and who is wrong are themselves dysfunctional and in need of therapy? 
To frame the problem of interconnectedness as a problem of trust, is to open ourselves up 
to situating ourselves within the ecology of preserving and safeguarding each other from harm 
and care - caring for each other as human beings, caring for our environment, caring for nature, 
caring enough to change power asymmetries, and caring for our history in ways that seeks to 
heal the wounds of past relationships.  What if we choose not open ourselves up to the ecology 
of caring? What if we choose to not give ourselves the gift of healing? To not go down the road 
to reconciliation is to not, as Burns notes, “to feel the need for change” because “where nothing 
is felt nothing matters” (1978, p. 44). Allow us to share a poem written by James Patrick Kinney, 
within the context of the American Civil Rights Movement where people of colour were fighting 
for their basic rights as American citizens and for the right to be treated with human dignity, 
while being treated with indignity and as non-persons in that process.  
 
The Cold Within 
 
Six men, trapped in happen-stance, 
In bleak and bitter cold. 
Each man possessed a stick of wood, 
Or so the story is told. 
Their dying fire in need of logs. 
The first man held his back, for of the faces around the fire, he noticed one was black. 
The second man looking across the way saw one not of his church 
And could not bring himself to give the fire his stick of birch. 
The third man, sat in tattered clothes, 
He gave his collar a hitch: “Why should his log be put to use to warm the idle rich?” 
The rich man sat and thought of all the wealth he had in store, 
And how to keep what he had earned from the lazy shiftless poor. 
The black man’s face bespoke revenge, 
As the fire passed from sight. 
All he saw in his stick of wood was a chance to spite the white. 
The last man of this forlorn group did nought except for gain, 
Giving only to those who gave is how he played the game. 
Their logs held tight in human hands was proof of human sin, 
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They did not die from the cold without, 
They died from the cold within. 
(as cited in Hawkins, 2012) 
 
The call to reconciliation is a call for all Canadians to actively participate in keeping their 
communal fire alive. Reconciliation calls all Canadians to “let go” of all that traps them to hold 
on tightly to their unconscious organizing principles of prejudice, negative labelling, orienting to 
others only in transactional ways, and desire for revenge. At the same time, insofar as “letting 
go,” from an ecosystemic thinking perspective, stands in a relationship with “letting come,” then 
what does the latter introduce to the reality of these six men in Kinney’s story? “Letting come,” 
introduces the possibility of possibilities. It awakens them to the possibility that other choices are 
available - choices that would keep their dwelling warm and alive from their decision to reignite 
the fire from within in spite of their cold reality. It offers the possibility, to quote the Man from 
La Mancha, for all Canadians to dream the impossible dream, to right the unrigtable wrong, to 
fight the unbeatable foe, to go to places where the brave dare not to go, and to quest reaching for 




In this article, we raised two questions. First, “for the sake of reconciliation and healing, what 
conditions must be present for all to act from the perspective that ‘we are all in this together?’ 
Second, what conditions prevent us from seeing and acting from this perspective? In response to 
both, we suggested that all in this dwelling place called Canada: 
 
 Situate themselves in the ecology of caring and trusting 
  Subordinate or surrender themselves to being governed by the principles of sparing, 
preserving, and safeguarding each other from harm or danger. 
 Attend to non-negotiable principles of social justice and treating persons as persons. 
 Shift away from their either-or dualistic thinking that has come to dominate our modern 
era. 
 Intentionally orient to the possibility of third, fourth, or fifth choices and to the possibility 
of possibilities. 
 Aspire for what they want as a collective by intentionally turning toward rather than away 
from practices that they want to see avoided in their public sphere.  
 Be willing to “let go” of hurt, pain, guilt, and a spirit of revenge and ”let come” the 
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In this contribution, we attempt to make a case for the fruitful potential of a prospective 
coordination between the principles of conflict management (particularly Burton’s views) and 
Habermas’s two deontological models., the latter being the “ideal speech community”  and 
communicative ethics. Firstly, we will enumerate the similarities between Habermas’s 
observations and those generated from the body of conflict management (CM) scholarship 
generally. We will secondly analyse the dissimilarities between those of Habermas and Burton in 
particular. Building on this foundation, we will thirdly assess a number of CM tools in light of 
Habermas’s two models, and will subsequently conclude that only two of them (integrative 
negotiation and analytical problem-solving (APS) workshops) are sufficiently compatible with 
Habermas’s proposals. By then employing a cross-cultural methodology to triangulate our 
findings, we will fourthly situate our discussion within the decolonisation debate presently 
enveloping the South African academic space. Habermas’s body of work may indeed be a valuable 
resource for improving conflict management techniques, even if it has taken quite long for this 
dialogue to get underway. 
 
Keywords 




Little has been written about Habermas‘s potentially beneficial influence on the field of conflict 
management, also known as peace studies. This is especially true of the British social science 
tradition’s overreliance on empiricism during the late twentieth century (Blackburn 1972), which 
prioritised knowledge derived from field research over speculation on the history of ideas. In this 
contribution, therefore, we argue that a proper understanding of Habermas’s communicative or 
linguistic post-Marxist turn (as exemplified by his idea of the “ideal speech community” and his 
communicative ethics model, explained below) has the potential to greatly enrich conflict 
management in achieving its intended goals of societal peace. We also aim to demonstrate the 
emancipatory utility of conflict management as an academic discipline.  
The purpose of our exercise is similarly to gauge the value of Habermas’s thinking for 
conflict management or peace studies, in view of his post-Marxist, post-revolutionary, non-violent 
communicative project and of his controversial impact on the social sciences in general. Both of 
these issues are explored in greater detail below. Then, in order to better conceptualise the topic in 
question, a number of similarities and dissimilarities between Habermas, on the one hand, and 
Burton, on the other, are outlined into a theoretical foundation for a constructive interaction 
between Habermas’s deontological models and the core principles of conflict management. The 
latter we aim to achieve by way of incorporating a cross-cultural criticism, in order to also 
triangulate our recommendations, as well as to present a good case for the validity of conflict 
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management in a post-colonial setting (such as South Africa). 
 
Habermas’s Theory and Its Contribution 
 
Despite the fact that conflict management is avowedly interdisciplinary (as extolled in the 
groundbreaking work of Burton, Isard and others), it is curious that Habermas’s famous work on 
communicative action, in contradistinction to revolution, has not fed into this literature concerning 
itself with peace and conflict resolution. Yet his writing has had an admirable effect on rational 
choice theory (Dryzek 1995), discourse-historical approach (DHA) to narrative (Forchtner 2020) 
and the potential democratization of transnational multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs [Martens, 
Van der Linden & Wörsdörfer 2019]) as examples of such beneficial feedback-loops. Habermas is 
also, without a doubt, the foremost exponent of the Second Generation of critical theorists in the 
tradition of the Frankfurt School. We argue that Burton is, for our purposes, a prime representative 
of conflict management scholarship, in particular his views on the pervasive nature of conflict in 
capitalist societies.  
As for Habermas, David Rasmussen (1995) defines critical theory in the tradition of the 
Frankfurt School as a particular intellectual orientation towards a critical theory of society with an 
emancipatory goal and a preoccupation with the relationship between praxis and theory, which 
found its inspiration in the ideas of Marx and Freud. It had its beginnings in the Frankfurt School 
with Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse as the foremost representatives of the First Generation, 
and found its contemporary reformulation in the work of Jürgen Habermas. To Rasmussen’s 
definition, one may add that the theories of Freud and Marx are critically appropriated and 
reconstructed to suit the aims of each of the three generations of critical theory. Additionally, by 
way of introducing the proposed relevance of Habermas, and in particular his communicative 
ethics model, to conflict management as a discipline, we identify the following seven similarities 
between critical theory as a research programme and conflict management as a behavioural 
science. 
 
Comparison between HABERMAS and BURTON 
 
At the most fundamental level, both are optimistic about the potential of human agency during 
conflict intervention. Therefore, they both emphasise the importance of understanding the causes 
of social conflict, as well as any efforts to resolve or manage it. Some critical theorists, on the other 
hand, are suspicious of many forms of conflict intervention, believing that they undermine the 
positive role that conflict plays in highlighting injustices in society. 
     Burton specifically rejected the theoretical foundation of state legitimacy as it manifested in 
the 1960s, because it was based on what he saw as ‘ideological’ construction. In this regard, he was 
thinking of Marxism, and the contract theories of the state, but, he also criticised constructs in 
social science, such as ‘economic man’ and ‘legal man’ (Burton 1997, 4-5). His search was for a 
more ‘scientific’ basis for intervention, leading ultimately to his promotion of the basic human 
needs framework with which he has now become associated. 
     Secondly, both critical theory and conflict management generate knowledge that promotes 
the development of better methods for lessening deal with the management or containment of 
societal conflict as a social phenomenon. In the words of Axel Hönneth (1995), “social 
pathologies” require resolution, while Gavin Bradshaw (2016) argues that conflict management 
seeks to both understand and resolve social conflict, in order to contribute to greater societal 




cohesion. By “social pathologies”, Hönneth makes reference to a range of social problems such as 
poverty, homelessness, crime and inequality.  
     Thirdly, both employ an interdisciplinary approach. Unsurprisingly, conflict is central to the 
problematic of the behavioural sciences (which includes the post-Marxist perspectives on conflict, 
found in critical theory), including their multi-disciplinary perspectives used to try and grasp this 
phenomenon. 
     Fourthly, Marxism had a profound influence on both critical theory and conflict management, 
and both appear to have moved beyond Marx in support of a post-Marxist paradigm. 
     Fifthly, in their respective attempts to transcend Marx, both critical theory (in its 
Habermasian mould) and conflict management (as it was conceived by Burton) oppose 
revolutionary violence as a conflict management tool, and instead favour solutions that utilise and 
improve communication. For instance, Burton’s early work on intervention explicitly proposes 
what he calls “‘controlled communication’” (Burton, 1969, Mitchell 2002).  
    Sixthly, both Habermas and Burton emphasise the significance of institutions as causal 
factors in the perpetuation of societal conflict. In this regard, Habermas is critical of all institutions 
that exclude themselves from rational debate, such as those which maintain the international 
capitalist system of states, as they are established through power relations, rather than rational 
consensus (Galtung and Kuur-Sorensen 2007). For Burton, because human beings are 
‘necessitous’ and driven by certain basic needs satisfactions, they have no option, when these 
needs are frustrated, but to rebel against dysfunctional institutions. In any conflict between humans 
and their institutions, he claims, humans will ultimately win (Burton, 1988: 53). He also writes 
critically of prevailing thinking in most political theory, namely: the belief that ‘Existing structures 
and institutions must be maintained, in particular, the economic structures, be they capitalist or 
socialist’ (Burton 1984, 11). 
    Finally, both critical theory and conflict management insist on the transformative value of 
theory to help refine the methodologies of activist intervention. 
     There are, however, two important dissimilarities between Burton and Habermas, 
exemplified by Jabri’s (1997) critique of Burton. Firstly, Burton insists that basic human needs - 
which cut across cultural and racial lines - motivate conflict and violence, and that the satisfaction 
of these ontological needs would therefore pre-empt violence and conflict from manifesting. On 
the other hand, Jabri and Habermas argue that humans have moral agency and that (and this is 
particularly true of Habermas's position) their capacity for language presupposes the peculiarly 
human ability to reach consensus. Secondly, Jabri points out that for Burton there remains an 
insurmountable dichotomy between the interests of power and the necessity of effective 
problem-solving, based on an understanding that the latter is the sine qua non of conflict 
resolution. Clearly, other mechanisms of intervention, such as mediation, might also be helpful in 
getting the quarrelling parties to the negotiating table in the first place. Although both Habermas 
and Burton emphasise communication as the optimal vehicle for sustainable conflict resolution, 
Habermas's model is deontological, which means that he does not prescribe any tools in advance, 
but instead evaluates their procedural fairness. Burton, on the other hand, seems to be too fixed on 
the idea that ‘problem-solving’ is the paramount exercise for the broader discourse of conflict 
resolution, a notion that is clearly untenable, as the development of conflict management 
techniques has manifested further variants, such as peacebuilding, and conflict management 
systems design. 
     Of the two differences between conflict management and critical theory, the first lies in the 
former addressing social (even deep-seated) conflict, while the latter aims to both identify actors 
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for emancipation and to create a platform for such emancipation (“emancipatory interests”, in 
Habermasian jargon). As such, critical theory, positioned halfway between philosophy proper and 
empirical social sciences, is a critical, emancipatory ‘science.’ The second difference lies in the 
fact that, whereas conflict management seeks to both understand conflict and develop conflict 
management systems that incorporate conflict management techniques (such as negotiation, 
mediation and workshop intervention initiatives), Habermas’s ideal speech community and theory 
of communicative ethics are both procedural models. In other words, whereas conflict 
management is essentially a teleological or substantive approach to conflict resolution, critical 
theory (and here we refer specifically to Habermas’s work) is a purely procedural or deontological 
model. We argue below that it is precisely this distinction between conflict management and 
Habermas’s two deontological models that provides the space for a beneficial enrichment of 
conflict management, both as an academic discipline, and as an activist enterprise. 
 
Habermas’s Procedural Models and  
Conflict Management Techniques 
 
We will now identify Habermas’s particular position within critical theory in the tradition of the 
Frankfurt School, after which we will proceed to outline his two procedural models. Habermas’s 
project has remained fairly consistent since the late 1970s, and yet it is important to appreciate how 
it has been substantiated and reinforced with sociology, political science, Anglo-American 
(analytical) philosophy and developmental psychology. Since his inaugural lecture “Knowledge 
and Human Interests: A General Perspective” in 1965 at Frankfurt, Habermas’s interest in 
emancipatory concerns expanded into a study of communicative competence, acting as a prelude 
to the publication of his two-volume magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative Action 
(1981/1984, 1987). The latter is the culmination of his thoughts on the original Frankfurt School’s 
interdisciplinary (and in Habermas’s case, even transdisciplinary) agenda of the 1920s (White 
1995, 17), as well as the formulation of what Dryzek (1995, 117), in a slightly different context, 
calls an interpretive (procedural) “normative grid.” These two important elements of his project 
are especially relevant to the goals of conflict management. Habermas insists that strategic action 
(manipulation, deceit, agenda), as opposed to communicative action, is only possible because, as 
humans, our very ability to speak is ingrained in the ability to reach consensus. In fact, for 
Habermas (1983), consensus is the criterion for truth, an insight which certainly taps into the soul 
of conflict management/ transformation. 
     With this theoretical context now in place, we are ready to compare the five conflict 
management techniques discussed by Bradshaw with Habermas’s two theoretical models, the ideal 
speech community and his communicative ethics. It is our argument that Habermas’s work is 
valuable for the study of conflict management because, among other considerations, it provides 
guidance on how to procedurally test the extent to which each of the aforementioned conflict 
resolution techniques approximates the counter-factual ‘ideal’ position portrayed in his two 
models (Dryzek 1995, 104). In Dryzek’s (op. cit.) words, Habermas’s model of communicative 
ethics (which encompasses communicative action, communicative rationality and systematically 
distorted communication) is very helpful for “specifying a procedural threshold for the recognition 
of a situation as truly collegial.” Stated differently, neither of Habermas’s models is actually 
achievable, but allows for an appreciation of how far substantive models fall short of the ideal 
position. 
     Meanwhile, according to Bradshaw (2008, 116), the discipline of conflict management seeks 




to both understand the cause(s) of societal conflict and to develop effective conflict resolution 
techniques. This summation holds even if, as Burton maintains, such strife is healthy, on the one 
hand, and conflict management practitioners are not always able to eliminate the source of such 
disturbances, on the other. In any case, Bradshaw (1994, 3-4) defines a conflict management 
system (CMS) as  
 
a permanent, rather than a once-off intervention, which is substantially “owned” by the 
parties to the conflict. It includes structures and institutions, and ongoing activities in 
pursuit of peace. It should be self-sustaining and accessible to the community at the point 
of need. Because conflicts shift and change, the CMS needs also to change and grow, 
constantly adapting to the needs of the changing conflict. The system should have built-in 
procedures for accessing resources, especially expertise and opportunities for planning. 
 
This definition highlights the role of fairness (provision for access to expertise and resources, as 
well as the importance of the process being ‘owned’ by the parties to the conflict) and the need for 
achieving (if at all feasible) a lasting solution. We therefore argue that an emphasis on fairness is 
essential for any attempt at conflict resolution (Bradshaw 2016). Habermas’s two models could 
then provide the procedural validity necessary for identifying the potential fairness of a 
prospective conflict resolution strategy, the latter being the substantive framework for our 
purposes. Habermas (1987, 375) himself is of the view that his work is not meant to replace extant 
methods used in the social sciences, but rather to assess their benefits and limitations. 
     Both of Habermas’s models are vital components of his account of ‘discourse-based 
morality.’ Moon (1995, 143) explains that 
 
Jürgen Habermas has presented one of the most powerful accounts of a discourse-based 
morality; it is grounded in an understanding of practical reason which explains how the 
validity of norms can be tested, thereby demonstrating their cognitive character. According 
to Habermas, valid norms can be freely accepted by all the individuals who are affected by 
them. Thus, a society whose institutions and practices were governed by valid norms 
would instantiate the ideal of a moral society. 
 
According to Moon, it is this aforementioned “cognitive character” of these norms that makes it 
possible for all affected to access, test and freely agree to their implementation. Since, therefore, 
Habermas’s models are eminently fair on procedural grounds, they are, by the same token, equally 
applicable to judge the validity claims of the conflict management techniques (negotiation, 
mediation, arbitration, etc.) generated by CMS, the latter having been previously defined by 
Bradshaw in the quotation given above. Dryzek (1995, 97) also very ably explores the contention 
that Habermas’s theory of communicative action “stands out […] in its ability to engage empirical 
science in fruitful dialogue.” 
     Next for our analysis is Habermas’s ideal speech community, which preceded his 
communicative ethics model. Together these two models provide an effective criterion by which 
to gauge the emancipatory justification for any methods developed by the social sciences 
(including those pertaining to conflict management.). Habermas (1975, 113) defines this ideal 
speech community as follows:  
 
[H]ow would the members of a social system, at a given stage in the development of 
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productive forces, have collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which 
norms would they have accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on the 
organization of social intercourse through discursive will-formation, with adequate 
knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives of their society? 
 
For Habermas, the members of this community are driven by a desire to adopt and implement 
whichever are the best arguments, and although this attitude is often a rarity around negotiation 
tables, where each participant has their own agenda it obviously functions as a methodological 
exemplar. His communicative ethics ideal, as noted above, consists of three moments, and we will 
briefly consider each of these before moving on to our proposed application of his two models to 
the five conflict management instruments explored by Bradshaw. Habermas (1984, 20) further 
describes communicative action as “reasons or grounds [advanced which] are meant to show that 
a norm recommended for acceptance expresses a generalizable interest,” and communicative 
rationality in these terms: 
 
In contexts of communicative action, we call someone rational only if he [or she] is able to 
put forward an assertion and, when criticized, to provide ground for it by pointing to 
appropriate evidence, but also if he is following an established norm and is able, when 
criticized, to justify his actions by explicating the given situation in the light of legitimate 
expectations. We even call someone rational if he [or she] makes known a desire or an 
intention, expresses a feeling or a mood, shares a secret, confesses a deed etc., and is then 
able to reassure critics in regard to the revealed experience by drawing practical 
consequences from it and behaving consistently thereafter. (Habermas 1984, 15) 
 
The ability to think through one’s position and to justify it with accessible rational motivations is 
therefore the key presupposition of Habermas’s communicative rationality. McCarthy (1978, 
132-133) argues that his ‘systematically distorted communication,’; being the result of the 
ideological disruption of meaningful communication, is of great significance to the emancipatory 
agenda of critical theory, since its elimination holds out the promise of collective political will- 
formation. Following the suggestion put forward by Dryzek (1995), therefore, we will now subject 
each of the following five conflict management tools to Habermas’s two models, in order to assess 
its structural compatibility with a certain spirit of fairness.  
     Bradshaw (2008, 76-110) identifies the following techniques that are used in conflict 
management: negotiation, facilitation, mediation, arbitration and analytical problem-solving 
workshops. 
 
CRITIQUING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES 
USING HABERMAS’S MODELS 
  
Negotiation can be understood as “a voluntary communication process between a number of 
individuals or groups, intended, through a process of give and take, or creative problem-solving, to 
arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement ”  (Bradshaw 2008, 76). Conflict management 
practitioners identify two distinct approaches to negotiation. Distributive negotiation, otherwise 
known as positional negotiation, or power bargaining, is characterised by the actors in the conflict 
exhibiting extreme and inflexible positions, as well as by their engaging in strategic maneuverings 
to get the better of other parties. The reconciliatory efficacy of power bargaining is appraised as 






Although it is familiar to most of us, and produces agreements, experience shows that the 
distributive approach to negotiation very often leaves parties dissatisfied with the 
negotiation outcome, and therefore with a settlement which is not durable in the long term. 
Relationships between the negotiating parties may also suffer long term damage, as a result 
of the power tactics that they use. (Bradshaw 2008, 77-78). 
 
The second negotiation approach to conflict resolution is called integrative bargaining. Its main 
features are “preserving the working relationships among the parties to the conflict,” an emphasis 
on “satisfying the interests of all the parties, and finding win-win solutions to common features” 
of potential resolutions (Bradshaw 2008, 79). Bradshaw (op. cit.) provides the following 
assessment of integrative negotiation: 
 
Fairness is an important guiding principle throughout. Because [of] the importance of 
maintaining good working relationships in a country as fraught with conflict as South 
Africa, it would be advisable to use integrative negotiation techniques as far as possible. 
Most recent research work on negotiation also supports the fact that integrative approaches 
are usually far more effective [than power bargaining]. 
 
This integrative bargaining comprises five central features of which we highlight four: 1.) focusing 
on the issues in question rather than the opposing parties (since the actors’ guiding concerns create 
incentive for both greater investment in the relationship and for more quickly reaching a viable 
conclusion to the dispute)., 2.) identifying common interests and gains likely to benefit all actors, 
3.) maintaining a standard of fairness (to which all actors can relate and will agree), and 4.) having 
alternatives to a negotiated settlement (Fisher and Ury 1991). 
     Now, after applying Habermas’s two models to negotiation as a conflict management tool in 
order to gauge its procedural fairness, there is little doubt that power bargaining fails greatly 
according to this criterion Its encouragement of the exploitation of power relations during 
negotiations invalidates the conflict resolution agenda in question and its processes, as well as 
exacerbates the conflict’s pre-existing systematic communicative distortions, since there is no real 
desire to reach the other actors and perhaps accommodate their concerns (however legitimate). 
Even if agreement is reached (as often happens), simmering tensions remain and such agreements 
are at best of a temporary, uneasy nature.  
     All five principles of integrative negotiation, on the other hand are very compatible with both 
of Habermas’s models. By focusing on the pertinent issues of the conflict, rather than on personal 
concerns, integrative negotiation better promotes more responsible consideration of the stakes in 
the dispute. Its commitment to achieving a win-win result for all actors also improves goodwill, 
which will lead to a greater durability of any agreements made and, if problems arise later 
(regarding issues such as interpretation or implementation), these are likely to be settled in the 
same spirit of congeniality. Recall too that Habermas values consistency as the highest measure of 
communicative rationality, and this is bound to add to the credibility and acceptability of the 
prospective arrangement to all actors concerned. Its emphasis on even-handedness and 
strengthening relationships are universal trademarks of healthy and sustainable negotiation. 
Systematic communicative distortions, however, such as power- plays, uneven access to resources 
or information pools, and interference with the agreed agenda, are almost certainly likely to 
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overshadow integrative negotiation, since (as the name denotes) the process is as necessary as the 
results. After all, a culture of fairness, as Bradshaw (2016) points out, is vital for social cohesion. 
Nevertheless, integrative negotiation receives full marks from a Habermasian perspective. At the 
outset of this paper, we also indicated our intention to argue that conflict management has 
emancipatory merit as an academic discipline according to a cross-culturally post-colonial 
perspective. 
     Now, it is our argument that integrative negotiation, mediation and Analytical 
Problem-Solving Workshops (the latter two more fully considered below), being particularly 
prominent tools in communitarian societies (unlike power bargaining), are vastly preferable to the 
spirit neo-colonial interests (which thrives on power bargaining). Communitarian societies are 
defined as comprising the following three elements: “1) densely enmeshed interdependency, 
where the interdependencies are characterized by 2) mutual obligation and trust, and (3) are 
interpreted as a matter of group loyalty rather than individual conscience” (Braithwaite 1989, 86). 
Examples of communitarian societies are found in the Far East, but also in traditional African 
societies where the relationship between actors to a dispute is considered to be of far greater 
concern and import than short-term gain, the latter of which is the primary consideration of power 
bargaining. Burton predominantly used the term ’power-bargaining’, and saw negotiation as part 
of the power framework that he emphatically rejected. He remained largely suspicious of 
negotiation’s ability to provide lasting solutions for deep-rooted social conflict, due to its reliance 
on the central mechanism of compromise, which he felt to be ineffective, or even dangerous, when 
basic human needs frustration was at the root of conflict. 
    Burton also specifically favoured the term ‘facilitation’ for the intermediary role in his 
problem-solving workshop. Facilitation is defined as efforts solely directed towards “improving 
the communication process among the parties as they seek to handle their own conflicts” 
(Bradshaw 2008, 89). The task of facilitators is to streamline the conflict resolution process, rather 
than to urge the actors on towards specific outcomes. From a Habermasian perspective (both the 
ideal speech community and his communicative ethics), any effort towards the clarification of 
systematic communicative distortions is to be welcomed. By asking questions in order to 
illuminate issues, or by suggesting means of achieving greater transparency, facilitators can do 
considerable justice to both his models’ aims, namely fairness and democratic confidence. 
     In the public imagination, there is probably no better-known conflict resolution mechanism 
than mediation. Moore (1986, 6) defines mediation as an “intervention of an acceptable, impartial, 
and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist contending 
parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement.” Both Moore (op. cit.) 
and Bradshaw (2008, 89) treat mediation as complementary to the negotiation process, and the 
latter is also of the view that a mediator may especially add value to a negotiation process that has 
become undone, or where the conflict in question may be particularly complex. As far as 
Habermas’s models are concerned, we would advise of this conflict resolution mechanism the 
same remarks as we did to facilitation; namely that any technique that incentivises greater 
communicative rationality and action, will receive a Habermasian nod of approval. For example, 
according to Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1986), particularly effective is a mediation intervention that 
aims to alter the social and physical dimensions of the dispute, as well as the format of the conflict 
resolution process, and finally to encourage a quicker resolution of the dispute. In the case of 
mediation in particular, the introduction of an acceptable, impartial and independent party to aid 
the actors in reaching an agreement of their own making, could be particularly effective. One is 
reminded of the valuable mediation work done by H. W. Van der Merwe (2000) during South 




Africa’s transition into democracy. His acceptability to all actors, which improved both the 
smoothness of the process and the palatability of the results, was noteworthy. 
    Mediation could also be immensely valuable for identifying systematic communicative 
distortions, the latter of which are almost always major stumbling blocks during negotiation 
efforts, especially if one or more of the actors involved engage(s) in power bargaining (or 
‘strategic action,’ in well-known Habermasian jargon). Bradshaw (2008, 94-95) also argues that 
“information-gathering and research” (especially if these resources or findings are made available 
on an equal footing to all the actors in the dispute) are often done if a mediator is brought in to 
assist with a particularly complex situation or deep-rooted problem. John Burton remained 
sceptical of the utility of mediation in instances of deep-rooted social conflict, as it is simply an 
extension of negotiation, with its central reliance on compromise, as mentioned above. He was 
particularly critical of some aspects of mediation, such as caucusing, where it opens the process up 
to manipulation by a mediator.  Arbitration differs from mediation, however, in that the former 
may impose a binding ruling on the parties even in the absence of agreement between the parties 
themselves. 
     Arbitration may be the result of a prior agreement between the parties, and amounts to either 
compulsory or voluntary interaction between the actors and a mutually acceptable judge in the 
form of an arbiter. The main difference between traditional litigation and arbitration is that the 
arbiter’s ruling is final and not appealable, and an arbitration award will be subjected to judicial 
review if irregularities, which also resulted in a prejudicial outcome, can be proven (Schellenberg 
1996, 195, 193). Arbitration is widely used in labour/management disputes and commercial 
agreements (such as those governed by shipping law and building management legislation), which 
often contain arbitration clauses (as is generally well known). The reason for such preferences for 
arbitration proceedings over that of conventional litigation is that the former is viewed as both cost 
and time effective. After all parties have had an opportunity to put their respective cases to the 
arbiter, and after they have questioned each party in order to gain sufficient clarity on their 
positions in the dispute, the arbiter adjourns. They are obliged to hand down a ruling within a 
specified period. 
     According to Bradshaw (2008, 102), the other crucial difference between mediation and 
arbitration is the practice of the arbiter suggesting a resolution to the parties after hearing their 
statements. Only if this is not acceptable to the parties, will the arbiter adjourn the proceedings for 
the purpose of bringing out an award. In the case of both arbitration and mediation, all parties have 
the benefit of an independent, and informed opinion. 
     From a Habermasian perspective, arbitration does not rank very high, even though, as noted 
above, it makes good sense in commercial disputes where time and cost may be as important as the 
award itself. The ideal speech community, however, is meant to be a space where all actors in a 
dispute are free from power manipulations and strive to find a solution on the basis of a unanimous 
concern for the best argument (a methodology which could be compromised if legal representation 
is permitted to play a role, as it does, in arbitration proceedings). Nevertheless, the three 
components of his communicative ethics model (systematic communicative distortions, 
communicative rationality and action) reveal arbitration to be a practical, if not ideal, arrangement 
for the management of disputes. 
     Systematic communicative distortions present during the arbitration hearing (such as time 
limitations, insufficient access to information or resources to invest in resolving the dispute, or 
power manipulations bearing on extraneous issues) will identify how far this conflict management 
instrument falls short of the ideal. However, incorporating Habermas’s communicative action and 
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rationality into the arbitration process is likely to produce high levels of compliance from the 
impacted parties. Firstly, as noted above, in commercial arrangements time (such as the 
timeframes of concluding the proceedings and handing down the award) and cost considerations 
are paramount, and likely to rank close to the value of the actual award itself. Secondly, arbitration 
proceedings inhibit the development of any generalisable interest for the parties involved. Thirdly, 
in commercial matters the parties are also likely to arrange their future affairs in such a way as to 
avoid peripheral issues. Fourthly, arbitration is often unlikely to have much or any lasting impact 
on the underlying discontent driving the conflict. Mediation and other conflict management tools 
(notably problem-solving workshops [Bradshaw 2008, 102]) are more equipped for identifying 
and meaningfully addressing the root causes of the strife. 
    John Burton (1984, 1990) presented a particular critique of what he called traditional methods 
of conflict management, being negotiation and mediated negotiation. He believed that these 
techniques always required compromises to be made, and in real conflict; deep-rooted social 
conflict; where basic human needs were at stake, agreements based on compromise would simply 
not hold. Instead, Burton is most closely associated with the conflict management technique 
known as analytical problem solving (APS) workshops. APS workshops, as instruments for 
conflict management, are defined as interventions aimed at confronting deep-rooted social 
conflict, though this tends to limit the role of mediation and negotiation (as complementary or 
elementary forms of conflict management). Although instrumental and process interventions are 
known to conflict management practitioners, APS workshops provide a well-structured process 
that can ensure “outcomes which are both legitimate and self-sustaining” (Bradshaw 2008, 105). 
In order to achieve this level of overall satisfaction, however, Burton (2001) insists that no 
participant or relevant issue involved in the dispute is excluded from the proceedings. The aim is to 
encourage the exploration of non-violent options to resolve or manage the conflict (De Reuck 197, 
74; Hill 1982, 121). Additionally, in order to keep systematic communicative distortions to a 
minimum, the process is entirely confidential (Tidwell 1998, 162; Burton 1987, 50-55). Burton 
(1987: 54) also favours holding workshops in a neutral venue in comfortable surroundings. As 
Bradshaw (2008, 106-107) observes, everything possible is done to avoid the power dynamics 
with which traditional negotiation and mediation are bedeviled. Furthermore, Burton (1997, 122) 
argues that the extensive arrangements made around the processes involved in APS workshops 
“enable [sic] the parties to a conflict to perceive more accurately the issues that are usually hidden 
in a power bargaining situation.” This requirement is essential as power-driven settlements, as 
mentioned above, might lead to agreements which are short-lived and leave the real discontent 
smoldering and undisturbed. Facilitating the parties’ attempts at “classification of [their] interests, 
values, needs, goals, and tactics [… in this way will] help [to] deduce possible outcomes on the 
basis of this analysis” (Fisher 1997, 33). 
     Unlike the psychoanalytic relationship (so highly valued by Habermas as a methodological 
model), Burton (1987, 44) discourages expert input that would be detrimental to the parties 
generating their own analytical insights. Interestingly, Suzy Orbach (2000) remarks that the 
analyst’s facilitation of the patient figuring out and reaching their own insights is vital to the 
psychoanalytic relationship. The rationale is that these self-generated (and thus self-owned) 
insights are so much more meaningful to the analysand, and so the analyst will go to considerable 
lengths to hold back on verbalising those insights to allow the patient to arrive at conclusions by 
and for themselves. 
    Finally, Bradshaw (2008, 109) explains that APS workshops are not considered an alternative 
to the negotiation process, but rather a prelude or necessary precondition to the actual negotiation 




processes to follow. Tidwell also (1998, 162, 163) points out that APS workshops attempt to 
generate new and creative ways of looking at the dispute in question. Building on Burton’s 
observation, therefore, analytical problem-solving aims to unearth and re-examine the roots of the 
problem, in order to affect a lasting impact towards resolving the dispute. 
     From a Habermasian perspective, APS workshops score high in their compatibility with both 
of his deontological models. With its accent on holistic inclusivity, this technique very strongly 
resonates with the spirit of the ‘ideal speech’ community. The premium that Burton (1987; Groom 
and Webb, 1987, 273-275) places on trust and trust-building exercises, as well as skills 
development for all involved (Doob and Foltz 1973, 496), also goes a long way to satisfy 
Habermas’s requirement for the values integral to validity claims inherent during debating. 
Habermas is, however, bound to take umbrage with Groom and Webb’s (1987, 264-267) 
suggestion that ‘weaker’ actors should not be empowered to level the playing field (an idea central 
to traditional mediation). In any event, APS workshop advocates have justified this approach by 
insisting that APS is an essential prelude to the actual negotiation processes (Burton 1990, 16). 
Finally, the importance that Habermas places on rational consistency in behaviour is quite 
complementary to the APS workshop framework as a whole, which greatly encourages 
non-judgmental, supportive and (open, approachable) questioning behavioural patterns. 
 
Conflict Management in South Africa 
 
In conclusion, two of the conflict management instruments outlined by Bradshaw, and briefly 
considered above are satisfactorily compatible with both of Habermas’s two deontological models. 
These two instruments are integrative negotiation and Analytical problem-solving (APS) 
workshops. Integrative negotiation, as we argued above, is eminently justifiable within a 
cross-culturally post-colonial (and perhaps even developmental) context, as power bargaining 
reinforces power relations in a similar fashion to traditionally racist and individualistic Western 
societies, while integrative negotiation (with its deep concern for the welfare of beneficial 
relationships) is more compatible with communitarian values. As noted above, communitarian 
societies include many traditional societies living in the Global South. APS workshops, which 
prepare all the parties of the dispute for negotiation and/or mediation, are also very communitarian 
events. 
     In the context of the current decolonisation debate raging across the present South African 
scene (Olivier 2018), we submit that Habermas’s body of work validates two of the conflict 
management instruments outlined by Bradshaw as credible in a post-colonial setting. It is 
noteworthy that Habermas is only now making an impact on a discipline such as peace 
studies/conflict management. We have attempted to triangulate our findings by considering the 
matter from a cross-cultural perspective.  
     It is therefore our argument that Habermas’s work enriches and validates the findings of 
scholars in this field devoted to the exploration of communicative, non-violent mechanisms of 
dispute resolution. This belated insemination might be the result of what Max Weber referred to as 
the fracturing of the sciences in the modern world, but the divisions between the disciplines are 
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